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FINANCING CONTINUING CARE RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES:
ALTERNATIVES FOR PROPRIETARY DEVELOPERS
FRANK F. TAPLIN
Abstract
Continuing care retirement communities house seniors with high levels of service including
nursing care. This thesis examines the factors that make development of continuing care
communities (CCRC's) difficult, and concentrates especially on the challenges of
structuring financing for proprietary CCRC's. After surveying these issues as they apply
to the product type in general, the thesis presents a case study of a project under
development, and draws conclusions on financial structuring from this empirical analysis.
The following sections correspond to the chapters:
2. A demographic overview raises several market-based constraints---and opportunities.
Seniors are the fastest growing segment of the U.S. population but are relatively small in
number now. The target market is delineated by age (residents are mostly over 75); by
gender and marital status (most, but not all, residents are unmarried women); and by
physical health. Affordability also limits the market, but is mitigated by the ability to spend
high proportions of income on the CCRC housing, and by the use of home equity. Low
mobility rates mean that effective capture rates are a low proportion of the qualified market.
3. Development of CCRC's is difficult for many non-financing reasons as well as
financing reasons. The former are manifold: the product involves complex configurations
of housing and services; state regulations prescribe specific procedures regarding CCRC
housing as well as nursing centers; development costs must include high physical plant and
marketing expenditures; and operating costs must reflect high service levels, slow
community maturation, and sometimes the risk of unpredictable refund and nursing care
liabilities.
4. Financing difficulty reflects complex retail fee structures and limitations on debt sources
for proprietary projects. There are three main fee structures: the entrance-fee structure,
condominium or cooperative ownership, and the all-rental structure. Each has varying
impacts on cost, marketing, project financing, management control, and other issues.
Permanent debt may depend on the fee structure, but in general it is difficult to obtain
project financing for CCRC's. Conventional mortgage financing is problematic in part
because of availability and equity requirements; bond financing (although common for
congregate housing for the elderly) is difficult to use with CCRC's.
5. "Ashford," the case study project, is a proprietary joint-venture in metropolitan Boston.
It will have 300 living units and a 60-bed nursing center. State regulation necessitated the
guarantee of unlimited nursing care, and has also influenced the tentative choice of
cooperative ownership as the fee structure. Ashford has four distinct profit centers which
can potentially benefit the developer (not counting fees), two of which also include the risk
of future liability. Startup revenue comes from the gross margin at initial sell-out.
Residential operating profit comes primarily from monthly fees. Resale profit occurs when
the developer resells units; resale operations constitute a significant risk because deflation
or slow resale of units may cause a shortfall of cash available for refunds when a resident
dies or leaves. By not guaranteeing refunds, the developer mitigates this risk, but does not
obviate the need to establish project reserves to cover such liability. The fourth profit
center, nursing operations, also includes a liability by subsidizing nursing care for
residents, for which reserve funding or long-term care insurance also reduces risk.
6. Ashford may be financed in one of three ways (only two of which the developer is
considering seriously). Resident financing (using upfront fees to take out the construction
financing), provides a substantial startup profit at Ashford and allows the greatest risk-
reduction by its ability to establish large reserves. Mortgage financing with a trust
(investing the upfront fees in a trust whose income funds the permanent debt service),
presents problems of negative arbitrage and reserve funding, among other drawbacks.
Mortgage financing with an all-rental fee structure has disadvantages including affordability
for residents and low profitability for the developer, although in particular inflationary
circumstances it can be highly profitable. For reasons of risk reduction and profitability,
this paper recommends resident financing for Ashford.
7. To build projects more affordable than upscale Ashford, developers should explore
alternative product configurations in housing and service levels, and try new strategies to
reduce the refund and nursing liabilities. Certain financing variations and new financial
products such as inexpensive credit enhancement would also increase the affordability (or
profitability for developers) of CCRC's.
Thesis Advisor: Lynne B. Sagalyn
Title: Assistant Professor of Planning and Real Estate Development
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Introduction
Elderly housing is currently one of the hottest segments of real estate
development---at least in terms of developer interest. Recreation-oriented
developments for active retirees are commonplace, but actual market activity
in developments serving the "old-old" is quite low. Such developments
serving this portion of the elderly market are called "retirement centers."
Retirement centers are attracting so much attention because of their potential
to meet changing housing demand from American seniors. The American
elderly population is expanding rapidly, both as a proportion of the entire
population and in absolute numbers. An increasing proportion of the elderly
themselves are the old-old over 75. A variety of ongoing economic and
social factors have begun to circumscribe the housing arrangements these
elderly have historically selected, and retirement center developers hope to
be one of the main beneficiaries of this changing demand. Private-sector
market activity, however, is in its infancy. Partly this reflects the fact that
retirement centers are a new real estate product; partly it reflects their
unusual complexity which makes development difficult.
Elderly Americans in general have three choices if they want housing
designed specifically for them. Recreation-oriented developments for
younger elderly are "go-go" developments. At the other end of the
spectrum, nursing homes are the "no-go" choice for those who are dependent
on nursing assistance. Retirement centers are the middle ground, the choice
for "slow-go" seniors who are ambulatory and substantially capable of living
independently yet in need of occasional assistance. These elderly are
virtually all over 70 years old, and mostly over 75.
Retirement centers generally fall into two categories, the continuing care
retirement community (CCRC) and the congregate community. This paper
primarily focuses on continuing care facilities, but distinctions between the
two types are blurring and reference will be made to congregates as
necessary. Both CCRC's and congregates group housing units around
common-area amenities, which include dining facilities, and they frequently
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provides an extensive array of services for residents such as housekeeping,
laundry, transportation, group activities and social counseling in addition to
meals. The main defining difference between continuing and congregate
(other differences are common in practice) is the provision of nursing care
as a service. CCRC's usually have a nursing center on-site for esident use,
and more importantly the project as a whole subsidizes the cost of nursing
care when particular residents use it. "Lifecare" projects are those that
subsidize usage so that a resident never pays more in the nursing center than
in the housing units (except perhaps for meals) and that guarantee that a
resident will always have access to nursing.
Congregates do not have nursing centers as part of the facility, and residents
who need long-term nursing care must move. Congregate operators are
blurring distinctions, however, by establishing liaisons with nursing homes
off-site. The nursing home operator may give priority access to outplaced
congregate residents, and may even subsidize patients from the congregate
out of nursing home funds. In practice, several other characteristics
differentiate CCRC's and congregates. Continuing care facilities usually
require an upfront fee in addition to monthly fees, and attract a more affluent
market. Congregates are almost always rental and, partly because come
congregates are publicly-sponsored, their residents are generally less
affluent. But these distinctions may not survive the rapid product
experimentation now transpiring.
A more recent product type, currently termed "assisted living," is a step
closer to traditional nursing homes. Built either within continuing care
communities, within congregates, or as stand-alone projects, assisted living
units provide most services in the resident's own unit, including meals, and
help with bathing and dressing. The in-unit assistance does not include
nursing care.
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1. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS DRIVE DEMAND FOR
RETIREMENT CENTERS
Few American seniors make any changes in their living arrangements after
the age of 70. While some move in with children during these years, and
some into nursing homes, retirement moves mostly occur much earlier when
seniors are more active. Typically this move is made to a recreation-oriented
retirement community.
A number of economic and social factors are now pressuring some seniors,
willingly or not, to consider alternatives in their older retirement years.
Social Security has in the last four decades vastly changed the economic status
of seniors. Together with private pensions, it has made them more affluent
on average than younger Americans, with a poverty rate of 12.4% versus
14.4% for the population as a whole. 1 But seniors face an expensive living
expense that their marginally higher affluence does not help them afford:
health care. They need more more of it than the rest of the population, and
its cost has long risen faster than inflation. The American health-care system
makes medical care relatively affordable to most elderly, but not long-term
care for which there is greater overall demand. Medicare has made
physician and hospitalization expenses more affordable, but does not cover
long-term nursing care (there is a 100-day limit on hospitalization).
Medicaid does cover such nursing expenses, and in fact it is the source of
over two-thirds of nursing home fees. But Medicaid is a means-tested public-
entitlement program which excludes most elderly. Thus elderly who do not
qualify for Medicaid, and cannot independently afford nursing homes or in-
home nursing care, are severely limited in obtaining nursing care.
Continuing care seeks to provide nursing care at a more affordable overall
price. Several other nursing-care factors also strengthen demand for
CCRC's. One is the negative, institutional image of nursing homes in
general, which causes seniors to resist relocation to one. Another is the need
among many elderly for short-term nursing care only. Hospitalization and
in-home care, used historically for this, are increasingly prohibitive.
1T.E. Ricks, "People's Perception of the Elderly As Being Poor Is Starting to Fade," Wall
Street Journal, 19 December 1985.
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Finally, and perhaps most important, many seniors have no immediate need
for nursing care but rather expectations of need. For them continuing care is
insurance that it will be available and affordable.
Other factors, some cost-related and some not, have created demand for
congregate as well as continuing care housing. The cost of in-home
household assistance which many elderly eventually need, such as
housekeeping and cooking, is increasingly unaffordable. Increasing mobility
throughout society often results in a long-distance separation between parents
and children. This reduces the availability of free assistance as well as
children's immediate social support.
All the above are need-based factors providing demand for slow-go housing.
At least two discretionary factors also generate demand. A desire for more
companionship is inducing some to forsake living alone for more structured
environments. Also, fears of personal security are influencing elderly to live
in environments more secure than individual homes.
Retirement centers are not the only mechanism to address these demands.
Much academic discussion in the last decade has suggested methods to allow
elderly to use equity in their homes to generate income for nursing and other
costs, while enabling them to remain at homes. Yet sale-leasebacks and
reverse annuity mortgages have rarely been put into practice, in part because
home equity is often too low to generate substantial income. CCRC's and
congregates can provide the services and social support that older seniors
need, at a lower cost which reflects centralized delivery and economies of
scale.
2. THE PLAYERS IN A NEW INDUSTRY
Non-profit groups were the first to develop these new housing types. Non-
profit ethnic and religious self-help organizations built antecedents of
lifecare as early as the 1920's. In the 1960's congregate and lifecare projects
became more common. Proprietary interests, alone or in joint-ventures with
non-profits, began activity in slow-go housing in the 1970's. Interest has
continued to grow although actual development by proprietary firms has
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been relatively infrequent. The efforts of the non-profits will continue to be
vitally important in serving the lower-income portion of the market,
especially in this era of diminishing direct public subsidies for housing of all
types. The impending entrance of more proprietary firms, however, offers
considerable benefits to the public as well as profit opportunities for the
companies themselves. The main public benefit may be far greater
availability of slow-go housing to a broader spectrum of the elderly
population. More facilities should be available to middle income seniors as
well as the more affluent.
The entrants to the field include not only real estate developers but also
hospitality and health care firms which view retirement centers as an
opportunity to diversify into related fields. Hotel firms such as Marriott
recognize the similarity of retirement center operations to hotels, and in
some cases have extensive real estate development experience. Hospitals and
nursing home groups such as Beverly Enterprises view retirement centers
either as locations for outplacement (hospitals) or feeders of private-paying
patients (nursing homes). Nursing homes are a component of continuing
care facilities, and for specific sites nursing homes may simply build the
residential units on adjacent land. All these players can benefit from joint
ventures with each other and local non-profit organizations. Others, such as
insurance companies, may emerge as financial players in the industry.
All these players, however, face a major restraint in addition to the currently
limited market size: CCRC's, and to a lesser extent congregates, are
extremely complex. CCRC's are four businesses in one: housing, services,
nursing care, and insurance. Development and operation is far more
intricate than other for-sale housing or apartment development. Real estate
developers, for example, are generally unfamiliar with all but the housing
component of CCRC's, and may even misunderstand the housing marketing
process which is different from most real estate marketing. Hospitals are
not used to providing long-term care in a residential setting. When the
complexities of CCRC's are combined the pressures a new product faces in
the financial and retail marketplace, the result is that financing them
successfully is a major hurdle for the proprietary developer.
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This paper explores the complexity of continuing care communities in detail,
and concentrates on how it affects project financing and retail fee structures.
Chapter 2 expands on the above discussion of demand with a demographic
overview of the CCRC target market. Chapter 3 describes the problems
created by product configuration, state regulation, high physical plant costs,
difficult marketing, and operating issues such as slow maturation of the
community and nursing expenses. Chapter 4 presents the alternative retail
fee structures for a CCRC, and discusses various debt financing sources.
Chapters 5 and 6 are a case study of a particular CCRC under development
which portray how the aforementioned concerns have influenced the
financing of one facility. Based on this empirical analysis, general financing
recommendations are made. Finally, Chapter 7 comments on strategies
which might benefit the financing of CCRC's.
This paper serves as an introduction to continuing care for the general
reader. It shows that the risks associated with CCRC's far exceed the usual
real estate risks of high vacancy, cost overruns, and interest rate fluctuations,
but that it is possible to profit considerably while delivering a product of high
social utility.
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The Market for a New Product:
A Demographic Overview
More than most types of housing, retirement centers serve highly specific
needs of the elderly in both services and housing layout. It is essential to tune
projects to these specific needs. This specificity also limits the size of the
market. Continuing care and congregate communities appeal to the same
market in some respects, but the higher cost and the nursing component of
continuing care attract a market that is generally more affluent and more
concerned about future health needs. Innovative product variations,
however, are blurring the distinctions between the these two products,
continuing care and congregates. As a result, this is blurring their respective
target markets as well. This chapter therefore discusses the basis of demand
for both product types and points out the differences where relevant.
Local circumstances may cause variations in demand as well, and extensive
local market analysis is necessary to determine the the presence of an
adequate market for a project. Examining the depth and competitiveness of a
selected market area, especially in the context of a particular site, is a vital
preparation to determining economic feasibility based on project financials.
Nevertheless, a review of national demographic data will suggest in crude
terms the overall size of the market, and indicate what opportunities and
limitations exist for proprietary developers.
This discussion indicates the depth of the market by surveying population
and household growth, living arrangements and household size, and the
frequency of need for assistance. It also surveys spending ability of seniors
from both current income and liquidated asset sources, and correlates this to
affordability of housing projects. Finally, a brief examination of migration
patterns and mobility rates shows some regional variation in the market as
well as absorption constraints.
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1. THE RESIDENT PROFILE
The typical resident of a congregate or CCRC is 80 years old, unmarried, and
female. One survey of CCRC's found the average age of residents to be 80.2
years. 1 The average age of entry is slightly younger, at 78.0 years. 2 Data
available for age of entry and resident age in congregates is similar despite
the congregates' lesser emphasis of health care. 3 Beyond these generalities,
retirement centers can include seniors from 70 to over 100, married couples
and unmarried men. These projects attract "second-stage" retirees. who are
mostly over 75 years old, and virtually all over 70. (Somewhat superfluous
age requirements usually set a minimum of 62 or 65 years.)
Size of the Market. The over-70 age group, the primary market for slow-
go housing, is the fastest growing age groups in the United States. It is
increasing in absolute size and as a proportion of the total population.
TABLE 2-1 shows long-term trends.
Developers should note that the size of this group is not huge compared to the
market for first-time-buyer housing or move-up housing. The population of
seniors 75 or older, however, is projected to almost double between 1980 and
2000, when it should constitute 6.5% of the population, and then increase by
two-thirds again before 2030, when 9.8% of the population is projected to be
75 or older. The growth will not be constant, reflecting baby booms and
busts; the decades with the greatest percentage increases are 1990-2000 and
2020-2030. The higher average growth rates of the elderly population will
lead to an increase in their proportion of the population as a whole. Among
the elderly themselves, growth will be highest among the "old-old." There
are currently far fewer over 75-year olds than 65-75 year olds, but the older
group is growing faster and eventually will predominate. All these statistics
1Howard E. Winklevoss and Alwyn V. Powell, Continuing Care Retirement Communities:
An Empirical, Financial and Legal Analysis, Homewood, IL: R.D. Irwin, 1984, p. 48.
2 Laventhol and Horwath, Lifecare Retirement Center Industry 1985. Philadelphia, PA:
Laventhol and Horwath, 1985, p. 22.
3 Real Estate Research Corporation, Rental Retirement Housing: New Opportunities,
Washington, D.C., date unknown, p.12.
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TABLE 2-1: ACTUAL AND PROJECTED ELDERLY POPULATION, 000's
YEAR TOTAL 65-74 % 75-84 % 85+ % ALL 65+ %
1970 203,310 12,447 6.1% 6,124 3.0% 1,409 0.7% 19,980 9.8%
1980 226,505 15,578 6.9% 7,727 3.4% 2,240 1.0% 25,545 11.3%
1990 249,731 18,054 7.2% 10,284 4.1% 3,461 1.4% 31,799 12.7%
2000 267,990 17,693 6.6% 12,207 4.6% 5,136 1.9% 35,036 13.1%
2010 283,141 20,279 7.2% 12,172 4.3% 6,818 2.4% 39,269 13.9%
2020 296,339 29,769 10.0% 14,280 4.8% 7,337 2.5% 51,386 17.3%
2030 304,330 34,416 11.3% 21,128 6.9% 8,801 2.9% 64,345 21.1%
AVERAGE ANNUAL COMPOUND GROWTH RATE, 1980-2020:
0.6% 1.6% 2.0% 2.8% 1.9%
Source: Housing a Maturing Population (ULI)
suggest a vastly increasing market for slow-go housing, although only a
fraction of the age-targeted group, as discussed below, will be able to afford
proprietary projects.
Equally important for housing development is household growth. While
declining numbers of 65-74 elderly from 1990-2000 (see TABLE 2-1) will
mean little growth of 65-74 households during this decade, 75 and older
households should increase continually through 2030. Declining average
household size will also contribute to growth in the number of households,
but this decline is stabilizing. It should not be as important a factor as
absolute growth itself.
Living Arrangements. The tendency of congregate and CCRC residents
to be female and single, widowed or divorced reflects both demographic
conditions and housing preferences. Residents comprise on average 20%-
25% males. 4 This is one male per four or three females. This primarily
reflects longer lifespans of women, who as a result dominate the 75-plus
population. There are 1.78 women for every man among over 75 year-olds.
Furthermore, men who are widowed as retirees tend to remarry, while
women do not largely because there are not enough available men. 1980
Census data shows the disparity in marriage rates of the elderly (over 65):
TABLE 2-2: MARITAL STATUS OF THE ELDERLY (65+), 1980
Men Women
MARRIED 77.0% 51.0%
WIDOWED 14.0% 40.0%
SINGLE/DIVORCED 9.0% 9.0%
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Real Estate Research Corporation
Reflecting their marital status, under 15% of men live alone but nearly 40%
of women do so. Because of preference elderly who live alone are more
likely than their married cohorts to move out of individual housing, for
reasons relating to companionship, security and need for personal and
10
4 Laventhol and Horwath, p. 23.
household assistance. Frequently couples who do move to slow-go housing
include one spouse with some sort of ailment.
Personal Assistance. The last factor, need for assistance in daily living, is
one of the prime causes of demand for slow-go housing as elderly seek such
assistance at lower cost than available in individual homes. The percentage of
elderly needing such assistance is as follows:
TABLE 2-3: PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION
NEEDING ASSISTANCE IN DAILY LIVING
Percent
18-44 YEARS 1%
45-64 YEARS 3%
65-74 YEARS OLD 7%
75-84 YEARS OLD 16%
85+ YEARS OLD 39%
Source: US National Center of Health Statistics
These figures include those who need skilled nursing care (registered-nurse
level) or intermediate nursing care (practical-nurse level) as well as those
who need only non-nursing custodial care. About 25% of elderly eventually
need nursing care, but at any one time in the U.S. today only about 5% of the
over-65 population is in a nursing home. Not all elderly wait until a need for
assistance develops to move from individual homes to retirement centers, but
a large proportion does. Most residents have at least one chronic ailment
upon entry.
2. THE AFFORDABILITY FACTOR
Many factors limit the market size of slow-go housing to less than the age-
qualified group, including low mobility rates and a preference for individual
housing as discussed below. But the major constraining factor, as with other
housing development, is affordability. The elderly poverty rate is slightly
lower than the rest of the population's, but it is still significant. While
congregate and continuing care housing may represent opportunities to
economize for middle- and upper-income individuals by reducing the costs
of services and nursing care, proprietary projects are still beyond the reach
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of a large segment of the age-qualified population. Unsubsidized non-profit
projects may only be marginally less expensive.
Slow-go housing should be slightly more affordable than other housing
because, with many services usually included, residents can can spend more
of their income on fees. Furthermore, the use of tax-exempt financing in
some congregate projects requires inclusion of below-market units. Yet the
problem of affordability remains significant. The following review of
seniors' economic status will illustrate how it will limit market penetration of
slow-go housing.
Qualifying Income. Because services such as one or more meals a day,
linen, housekeeping, and transportation, and limited amounts of nursing care
in CCRC's, are usually included in fees, seniors without other debts can spend
up to 60% of their gross income on rent and maintenance fees. In practice,
most spend 40%-50%.5 With $15,000 of income, a household can afford a
monthly fee of $750 if spending 60% of its income. Currently, monthly fees
in the least expensive proprietary congregate projects start at about $750-
$800 per month. Thus cash income of $15,000 is the ostensibly the
approximate threshold of affordability.
However, this slightly understates affordability for several reasons:
1) Shared living arrangements, such as roommate-style two bedroom
apartments, allow residents to substantially reduce individual fees by living
with friends or non-spouse relatives.
2) Third parties, such as children or insurance companies, may contribute to
the cost of the housing. Third parties have historically paid only about 1 % of
nursing home costs directly, and there is no indication that childrens'
contributions would significantly increase for slow-go housing.6 However,
insurance policies covering long-term care may become more common.
5 Al Scott et al, conference on lifecare, NAHB annual convention, Dallas, January 1986
(from tape).
6 Winklevoss,p. 6.
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3) Most importantly, seniors moving into slow-go housing are likely to
convert home equity into income-producing assets, if it is not needed for
entrance fees or unit purchase.
Home Equity. Over 70% of over-65 households are homeowners, with
little difference between 65-74 households and over-75 households. 7 (There
is a drop from the 55-64 age group as initial retirement changes are made.)
Over 80% of the elderly own their homes free and clear. Average net home
equity per household is $69,700 in the 65-69 group, $57,800 for 70-74 year
old homes, and $55,100 for 75 plus homes. Median equity for all groups is
considerably lower. 8 When potential income from converted equity is
added, affordability increases significantly. While the equity is frequently
not enough to pay for entrance fees at proprietary projects, which often start
above $100,000, it enhances the affordability of rental projects.
TABLE 2-4 shows income distribution of households 70-plus. Cash income
includes social security, investment income, government and private
pensions, and earnings from elderly who continue to work.
TABLE 2-4: INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF 70+ HOUSEHOLDS, 1985
CASH INCOME WITH POTENTIAL
EQUITY*
Income Households % Households %
$0 -9999 2,337,000 19.0% 1,845,000 15.0%
$15,000-$24,999 2,337,000 19.0% 3,198,000 26.0%
$25,000-$34,999 984,000 8.0% 1,107,000 9.0%
$35,000 + 1,107,000 9.0% 1,722,000 14.0%
TOTAL 12,300,000 100.0% 12,300,000 100.0%
*Assuming homes are sold and net proceeds invested at 10%.
Source: Real Estate Research Corporation
The proportion of households meeting the cut-off threshold for proprietary,
all-rental congregate housing may increase by more than a third with home
equity. The table above indicates that a maximum of 36% of households
7 Real Estate Research Corporation, p. 8.
8ibid.
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TABLE 2-5: AFFORDABILITY OF MONTHLY PAYMENTS WITH EQUITY INCOME, 1985
HOUSEHOLDS THAT CAN AFFORD
ONE PERSON HOUSEHOLDS
70-74
75+
Percent of total
TWO PERSON HOUSEHOLDS
70-74
75+
Percent of total
$800
905,000
1,446,000
40.1%
1,569,000
1,943,000
59.9%
INCLUSIVE MONTHLY PAYMENTS OF:
$1,000 $1,200 $1,500 $1,800 $2,200
518,000
885,000
32.4%
1,249,000
1,678,000
67.6%
391,000
556,000
31.2%
914,000
1,177,000
68.8%
197,000
390,000
32.5%
484,000
737,000
67.5%
128,000
340,000
30.9%
320,000
725,000
69.1%
107,000
320,000
36.6%
171,000
570,000
63.4%
5,863,000 4,330,000 3,038,000 1,808,000 1,513,000 1,168,000
PERCENT OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS
Source: Real Estate Research Corporation
47.7% 35.2% 24.7% 14.7%
TOTAL
12.3% 9.5%
could afford slow-go housing, or 49% with income from home equity,
although the actual percentages are somewhat different, reflecting household
size (fees for two-person units are higher) and income (lower incomes can
spend less than 60% of their income). Taking these factors into account,
TABLE 2-5 presents a more precise profile of affordability. (The figures
assume that monthly fees include one meal per day, utilities, linen,
transportation, and housekeeping. Income spent on housing ranges from
50%-60% depending on household type.)
TABLE 2-5 also shows decreasing affordability for higher cost
developments, which significantly narrows the market for CCRC's in
comparison with congregates. Proprietary CCRC's, to be financially solvent
as all rental programs, would be at the top of this range. No proprietary,
full-service CCRC's could charge as little as $800 per month on an all-rental
basis. They could charge $800 per month combined with entrance fees,
which typically range upward of $100,000 at proprietary projects. Based on
affordability alone, a much larger market exists for congregates. The
affordability factor is the strongest challenge facing developers of continuing
care facilities today. Developers of proprietary CCRC's must bear in mind
that their customers, while growing fast, are few in number to start with.
In the future, the affordability of both congregates and CCRC's should be
helped by rising elderly income from private pension funds, whose coverage
of the population and benefits in real terms are rising. In fact, elderly
income as a whole is projected to grow in real terms.9 And social security,
although it accounts for a minority of seniors' income, helps make incomes
inflation-proof as benefit increases keep pace with the Consumer Price
Index. The long-term future of Social Security is questionable, but in the
near future it should provide stability in benefit levels.
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3. NOT-SO-MOBILE: PROBLEMS IN ACHIEVING A HIGH
CAPTURE RATE
Affordability is one problem retirement center developers must face. The
reluctance of "old" seniors to move out of their individual homes and change
lifestyles is another one. Biases against moving will keep the majority of
qualified seniors away from slow-go housing. If seniors move at all in their
retirement, it is likely to be in their "first-stage," active retirement years.
Many construe a move to slow-go housing as an admission of frailty, and thus
resist it. Although exceptions exist, usually the move comes after the onset of
some health ailment and the benefits of a move are recognized. 10 This
behavior may change as the concept becomes more familiar. For now, the
result for developers is slow absorption. Projects of 150 units or more are
likely to take 18-36 months to lease up or sell out.
Low elderly mobility rates reflect this bias against change in living
arrangements. While 7% of owner occupants in the U.S. moved from 1982-
1983, only 2% of over-65 households did. For renters, the respective
percentages are 32% and 9%.11 Since those likely to be able to afford slow-
go housing, especially CCRC's, are also likely to be owners with equity
income, the effective capture rates are much lower than the affordability
rates. Currently, estimates of market capture range from 2% to 5% of the -
age-qualified, income-qualified seniors in a market area (including home
equity). 12 When separate projects are competing in the same market areas,
their individual capture rates are necessarily lower than the overall capture
rates. Over time, overall capture rates will increase as slow-go housing
becomes easier to market. In the meantime, affordability and mobility
constraints are a reality. Some markets may be overbuilt as premature
development outpaces absorption. Detailed local market studies and
competitive analyses are vital to verify an adequate market.
10 Interview with Sandra Howel, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass, May 1986.
1 1 Stockman, Leslie and June Fletcher, "A Maturing Market," Builder, June 1985, p. 75;
and Real Estate Research Corporation, p. 7.
12 ibid., p. 15; and Richard Jaffrey, conference on retirement centers, NAHB annual
convention, Dallas, January 1986 (from tape).
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Current concentrations of elderly, and their migration patterns, show some
regional variation. Growth rates among the elderly population are highest in
the Sunbelt and in the West. California, Arizona and Florida have
particularly high elderly growth rates since they serve as "magnet" states for
interstate movers. Interstate mobility, however, is not important for
retirement centers. Most of the interstate movers (who only constitute about
10% of all elderly) are too young for retirement center housing and are
couples who are less likely than singles to move out of individual housing.
Slow-go housing attracts residents from highly localized market areas; most
purchasers come from within their state, and those who do not are usually
returning to their pre-retirement areas after an earlier retirement move.
Thus feasible market areas, depending on competition, often exist
everywhere a 10-mile market has enough income and age qualified elderly to
sustain a project at the expected capture and market share rates. Such market
areas are just as frequently outside the South and West as inside. In 1980
over half of Americans over 65 lived in just seven states: California and New
York each had over two million, while Florida, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania
and Texas each had over 1 million. Because of its unique nature, slow-go
housing does not compete with other types of housing stock. Rustbelt
markets with little opportunity for other types of housing development can
support slow-so projects.
The eventual potential of retirement centers is difficult to estimate, due to the
unpredictability of capture rates. Currentlyl.0%-1.5% of 70-plus
households live in slow-go housing. There are at least 140,000 units in
congregate and CCRC's, not including adjoining nursing beds. 13 Very few
of these projects are proprietary. Thus the total stock of retirement center
units is a fraction of the annual production of multifamily homes. The
market is almost certain to expand considerably as economic and social
pressures strengthen demand, and as the concept becomes more familiar and
projects more attractive. Expectations of market acceptance seem justified
by data such as a preference survey in which 2.3%-6.5% of retirees would
13 Stroud Curran, conference on lifecare, NAHB annual convention, Dallas, January 1986
(from tape).
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certainly live in continuing care or congregate care respectively, and 54.6%-
58.7% would consider them. 14
The demographics suggest a downside risk as well. As noted above, it is a
growth market but a small one at present. In the real estate environment of
the 1980's developers are generally expanding into new products faster than
they have in the past. In the retirement center field, real estate firms also
must compete with outsiders as well. But for one factor, the attention slow-
go housing receives at conferences and in trade publications suggests that
overbuilding would emerge in some areas. That factor is the number of
obstacles that make development difficult even when an adequate market
exists. Chapter 3 points out some of these obstacles in more detail.
14 Eli Adams, "The Graying of America," Professional Builder, April 1986, p. 69.
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The Obstacles to Continuing Care
Development
In the realm of commercial and residential real estate, developing a
continuing care community is an extremely complex endeavor. It rivals
large, mixed-use urban development for complexity. This chapter discusses
some of the aspects of CCRC's, aside from financing issues, that complicate
their development. These characteristics require special development and
management skills, mandate prolonged development planning and start up
periods, and require adherence to high levels of regulation. It is also
important to understand how some of the financing complications are
responses to these management, timing and regulatory factors. Structuring
better financing mechanisms necessitates in part accommodating these
influences.
These development difficulties frequently result in higher initial and
operating costs, although it is not clear that corresponding higher financial
returns compensate. The realizable returns are also frequently different in
nature than those from other real estate investments. They help to explain
why proprietary real estate developers have not been more active in
continuing care housing, and why proprietary developers from outside the
real estate field, such as health care and hotel firms, are among those who
have made initial forays into the field.
1. FOUR BUSINESSES IN ONE: THE COMPLEXITY OF THE
PRODUCT
Continuing care projects include an array of housing, service, health care and
even insurance provisions that make for a complex real estate product.
CCRC's may have unit types and services to cater to virtually anyone over 70
years old short of those who need acute care. Alternatively, they may be a
more narrow product. The first development obstacle is to define precisely
the program for a given development.
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Project Size and Mix. Two surveys of continuing care projects indicate
what typical configurations are, how they vary between proprietary and non-
profit developments and what trends are appearing in new centers. 1 Another
survey of congregates indicates how CCRC's differ.2 The two surveys of
continuing care communities describe almost entirely non-profit projects,
and they also include a large number of early facilities built before 1970.
Perhaps fewer than 10% of CCRC's in operation now are proprietary,
although proprietary firms are frequently involved in non-profit projects as
managers and development consultants. One of the surveys found a median
of 165 units, with 217 for post-1970 projects. The survey of congregate
projects, all of which were market rate rental projects, showed an average
project size of about 150 units.
Both congregate and continuing care projects have predominately one
bedroom units, with a few studios and slightly more two bedroom units.
Recent proprietary projects appear to have increased the number of two
bedroom units at the expense of studio and one-bedroom units, hoping to
attract more couples and to entice prospects who live in relatively large
homes. Another trend is that while developers are eliminating studios as
individual units, they are increasing them as personal or assisted care units.
These are units in which assistants (not nurses) serve meals, help residents
dress, do housekeeping, etc. Congregate developers as well are increasingly
building assisted care units to retain residents who would otherwise move out
when they could not support themselves independently. This is one way by
which congregates are blurring distinctions with CCRC's. About half of
CCRC's have personal care units, and nearly all have separate nursing beds in
a centralized nursing center. Usually the nursing center includes both
intermediate and skilled nursing beds in a mixture of semi-private and
private rooms. CCRC's generally have between three and five independent
living units per nursing bed.
A summary of typical project configurations is as follows:
1Laventhol and Horwath, and Winklevoss. Each surveyed 100-200 projects, almost all of
which are non-profits.
2 Real Estate Research Corporation. Surveyed over 40 proprietary projects.
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TABLE 3-1 TYPICAL CCRC UNIT MIX AND FACILITY SIZE
Unit Mix Size
ILU'S*
STUDIOS 0%-20% 350-450 SF
1 BR 50%-60% 550-750 SF
2 BR 20%-50% 650-1000 SF
TOTAL ILU'S 200-300
ASSISTED UNITS 20-50 330-450 SF
NURSING BEDS 60-120 330-400 SF
ACTIVITY CENTER 18,000-30,000 SF
TOTAL FACILITY SIZE 230,000-400,000 SF
* Independent Living Units
Source: Real Estate Finance Journal, Summer 1985
Deciding on the overall project size, and the unit mix and unit size, is a
critical development decision. Because of the labor-intensive services and
common area amenities in most projects, economies of scale play a big role in
profitability. At the same time, management control considerations and the
need for a residential atmosphere limit project size.
Service Provisions. According to the surveys, levels of service provided
are even more varied than unit types, and their pricing, as discussed below,
depends on whether the services are offered inclusively or "unbundled."
Access to nursing care is guaranteed by virtually all CCRC's under some sort
of pricing. Availability of other types of basic health care vary. 25%-35%
provide for routine exams and a third have a physician on staff. Virtually all
require entering residents to have full medical insurance, such as Part B of
Medicare, to pay for further medical care in hospitals. Such insurance
provides very limited reimbursement of nursing home care.
All CCRC's (and congregates) provide common dining service, from one to
three meals a day, and a majority provide tray service in units and
accommodation for special diets when needed. Services usually include
social counseling, recreational therapy and limited transportation, as well as
provision of flat linen and weekly or biweekly apartment cleaning. Most
CCRC's arrange social and cultural activities and outings for residents.
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This complexity in physical and service characteristics creates many
opportunities in financial structuring. Nursing and meal services, for
example, can be treated as separate profit centers or as expenses. Recent
CCRC facilities have experimented with the "unbundling" of services,
pricing them on a fee-for-service basis, to make projects more affordable to
those who don't want or need the services. Likewise, all income can be
commingled or can be earmarked for different expenses such as debt service
or nursing. There are numerous choices in determining a program, and
usually each has different financial implications.
2. THE PRESENCE OF STATE REGULATION
While all real estate development is subject to local regulation in the form of
zoning restrictions, building codes, and sales procedures, continuing care is
increasingly subject to greater levels of regulation. States generate most of
this regulation. It can affect project financing and operating procedures as
well as the zoning and sales stipulations that normally bear on development.
Nursing centers are regulated separately as well in all 50 states. While
nursing home operators entering the field are experienced in doing business
with this degree of state regulation, other proprietary developers generally
are not. This factor has probably deterred some from entering the field, and
the state-mandated procedures must be addressed in the development process.
Nursing Center Regulation. State nursing home regulation generally
centers on the requirement for a Certificate of Need (CON). One reason
states control construction of nursing beds is to control Medicaid costs; since
a majority of reimbursements are paid by Medicaid, regulations are felt to
prevent pass-through of excessive costs when facilities are built
unnecessarily. The nursing centers of CCRC's may be "closed," meaning
only available to CCRC residents, in which case only design guidelines and
not the CON requirement may apply. But far more likely are "open" nursing
centers which allow utilization of empty beds by non-residents, and generally
require adherence to local "bed need" limitations before a CON is granted.
Obtaining CON's for nursing centers may also be complicated by the
negotiation of resident and non-resident allocation of beds. By guaranteeing
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nursing beds to residents, it may be necessary to keep beds empty even when
outsiders want them.
Two states (California and Illinois) may soon take steps toward exempting
CCRC nursing centers from the CON procedure entirely. Massachusetts, at
least, allows special approval for CCRC nursing centers that stand-alone
nursing homes do not benefit from. These regulations reflect a rationale that
CCRC nursing centers serve mostly the community itself after maturation,
and that they should be encouraged because they provide low-cost nursing
care to some elderly who might otherwise deplete their own funds to qualify
for Medicaid. If less regulation of CCRC nursing centers becomes a trend,
then the time-consuming CON process may no longer be a part of developing
most CCRC's.
CCRC Regulation. Aside from the regulation of the nursing component,-
13 states, at last count, regulate CCRC's themselves. The states are Arizona,
California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. More states,
including Massachusetts, are now considering regulation. These regulations
originated with a number of project failures, both non-profits and
proprietary, in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Most of the failures were
due to unintended undercapitalization, but some may have involved fraud.
They brought attention to the possibility that seniors might lose their life
savings. The regulations vary from state to state, with provisions that vary in
extent of their coverage. One state, New York, prohibits CCRC's outright.
All-rental facilities are generally exempt. At their most extensive, the
regulations have three general provisions:
- Predevelopment certification to screen developers and sponsors
- Disclosure provisions to residents before and after purchase
- Financial stipulations to prevent the loss of buyers' funds
Predevelopment Certification. At least nine states with the most
comprehensive regulations require project certification. The certification
rules attempt to determine the "financial stability and capacity, the sincerity,
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and the integrity" of continuing care developers. 3 Most do so by requiring
submission of financial condition and projected financial data from projects
such as income statements and balance sheets. Annual resubmittal of the
project data is required, and some states recertify the facilities while in the
others the original certification is valid until revoked. Certification is
necessary before sales contracts can be signed. The information disclosed to
states is information that competent developers will assemble for their own
proformas. The main effect on developers may be increased development
time.
Disclosure. The disclosure requirements are similar to condominium
offering statements except that more financial projections are required which
include basic cost and sales revenue data rather than simply income and
expense data. At least two states also require annual disclosure of this
information to current residents. While the basic level of information
disclosed does not fully expose financial structuring of a project, it should
have the effect of encouraging financial solvency. Conceivably, it may
discourage some innovative financing techniques.
Other provisions relating to purchaser rights include stipulations on sales
procedures such as "cooling off periods," and the right of residents to form
residents' associations. All of these purchaser rights provisions are like
condominium regulations. Some states, however, are giving purchasers
greater ability to rescind contracts than with other real estate, making it
possible for a presale buyer to change his or her mind at any time for a full
refund of the deposit. This makes purchase and sale agreements somewhat
useless as collateral for construction loans.
Financial Status. The financial provisions relate primarily to the
escrowing of buyer's funds before they occupy their unit and the
establishment of a reserve fund. In a sense, escrow requirements are a
backup protection for residents in case the certification and disclosure
regulations do not effectively prevent project failure in the initial
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3 Winklevoss, p. 231.
development stages. 4 During presale efforts especially, the failure of an
anticipated market to materialize will not endanger initial buyers' payments
if escrow procedures are in place. The escrow regulations restrict access to -
funds that could otherwise be available for construction. Furthermore,
release of the funds may not come at occupancy; in some states if fewer than
50% of units are finished and occupied then release is delayed.
Some states require a proportion of presales before construction can begin to
reduce risk. Requirements for reserve---money which must be set aside for
contingencies---range from a full year's debt service to no requirement.
These attempt to ensure short-term solvency if actuarial predictions are
wrong, expenses unexpectedly high, occupancy drops or income generated
from turnover is too low. Many of the states also mandate refunds of
entrance fees at a given amortization rates.
Because of the regulations' definitions of the CCRC facilities which they
cover, all the statutes affect projects with entrance fees and not rental, fee-
for-service price structures. Thus developers can escape regulation through
alternative fee structures, but in practice all-rental pricing is difficult to use
because monthly fees have to be very high. Regulation of rental CCRC's has
been proposed in several states. Regulation of congregates is also a proposal
in some statehouses.
There is a bias against proprietary operators in some statutes, ostensibly
based on feelings that profit-making activity involved caring for the elderly
is prone to abuses. Michigan, for example, prohibits proprietary developers
from "pure" lifecare development. This sort of bias, distinguishing non-
profit from proprietary operators, does not seem to be a trend. At any rate,
prohibitions on proprietary sponsorship could be easily circumvented by
setting up non-profit development entities and earning revenue from
management and development contracts.
Developers may debate whether the regulations are appropriate or not, but it
likely that most states will eventually have comprehensive laws. In the short
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term, comprehensive regulations probably help the industry's public image,
and in fact few of the stipulations are directly onerous. Their primary
impact is to delay development time considerably, and to raise legal fees.
3. EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT COSTS
Some aspects of continuing care (and congregate) housing development
constitute "extraordinary" costs that other housing development does not
entail. This section describes them under the headings Physical Plant Costs
and Marketing and Startup Difficulties.
Physical Plant Costs. CCRC and congregate projects have more
comprehensive facilities than other types of residential development.
Common areas include kitchen and dining facilities, lounges, and frequently
convenience stores, workshops, meeting rooms, etc. Usually 10% or more
of total floor area is devoted to such common area, around 20% to
circulation, and the remainder of 70% to rentable space. This efficiency
ratio of 70% is lower than in apartments, whose ratio is usually above 80%.
Amortizing the cost of these facilities over more units obviously decreases
the per unit cost. Nursing centers in CCRC's occupy additional area. They
further increase cost per unit, although states often set a maximum cost
regardless of who pays.
Retirement center projects do not need some outdoor amenities which other
multifamily housing normally includes. Pools and tennis courts, for
example, are not standard in most market areas. High parking ratios are also
unnecessary. Ratios of 0.5, or even 0.25 spaces per unit are usually adequate,
although it is sometimes difficult to get local approval for such a low ratio.
Unlike some amenities in other types of projects, in slow-go projects the
common facilities must be built upfront rather than phased with construction
of units. Some, such as dining facilities, are necessary for operations. And
residents do not have the disposition to wait for long-term delivery of
amenities.
Living units and common areas require some special design and equipment
for elderly needs. These increase construction costs over typical multifamily
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construction, but also require extra time and expertise in the design phase.
The units usually include emergency and safety equipment such as call
systems in bedrooms and bathrooms tied to central stations, and grab bars in
baths. Some units may be fully equipped for handicapped use. They should
also include convenience features such as lever doorknobs and high high
placement of outlets. In common areas convenience features such as
handrails, color coding of materials and frequent placement elevators are
desirable. (All independent units include full kitchens for marketing and
regulatory reasons in the case of some Federal insurance programs.)
Frequently location is a greater factor in physical plant costs than
construction. With highly localized primary market areas, it is necessary to
locate projects in areas well populated with income-qualified elderly, near
medical facilities, and near shopping. This usually indicates an urban or
suburban infill location, not a site on the fringe of suburban development. As
a result site acquisition costs can be higher than for typical new housing
construction. Rezoning or special permitting is also common because few
zoning codes provide for the retirement center mix of institutional and
multifamily residential, especially if surrounded by an established single
family area. Zoning approval is frequently a time-consuming part of
retirement center development. And while zoning delays are common to
most large-scale real estate development, with CCRC's regulation often
exacerbates the delay by tying state CON approval to zoning approval. Thus
it is not uncommon to have a development planning period of several years,
time that is consumed by state approvals, zoning approval, design
development, and presale marketing. The next section discusses the
marketing factor.
Marketing and Startup Difficulties. Retirement center housing is hard
to market, and the resulting long startup period is long and expensive. This
has several ramifications in the financial structuring of projects. Part of the
marketing difficulty stems from the newness of the product and resistance to
it; part stems from the slow pace at which prospective buyers make decisions.
Congregate and continuing care projects exist in most metropolitan areas in
the U.S., but their status as non-profit, stand-alone centers which may
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advertise relatively seldom often keeps their profile low. Thus the concept of
congregate and continuing care may be new to prospects. Even when it is
not, the fee structures may be complex and require lengthy explanation to
prospects, their lawyers and their accountants. The cost is high compared to
housing options with less service, so the value of the services must be
clarified. Rental fee structures are easiest to understand, and offer the most
liquidity for residents. Entrance fees are little understood and difficult to
market, especially when withdrawal or death does not qualify for a refund.
Because marketing entrance fee schemes without refund provisions has
become extremely difficult, most projects now give refunds on most of the
entrance fee or on an amortizing schedule. Another alternative is to sell units
as condominiums or coops, which is more marketable since it involves a
form of ownership most prospects are familiar with. An objective in
determining pricing, aside from financial factors, is to achieve high
marketability.
Usually, commencement of construction is contingent on preselling or
preleasing 50% or more of the project, because lenders, states or developers
themselves set this target to minimize risk. The presales provide tangible
evidence of project feasibility. From a marketing standpoint presales are
hard to do because the project must be sold as a concept through
representations.
Even with a familiar and marketable product, the purchasing habits of
prospective residents results in a long startup period. Chapter 2 noted the
low capture rates of retirement center housing. Most prospects prefer their
own individual homes, and make decisions on a move with reluctance when
they feel they must. Most wait until the onset of an ailment to move. A
decision to move characteristically comes three to six months after the initial
visit, following several subsequent visits, and involves children and lawyers
or accountants. As with move-up housing, closing can be delayed by
prolonged sales of former homes. Health screening of prospects, to ensure
their ability at first to live independently, and financial screening may
further eliminate some prospects.
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A marketing obstacle proprietary developers must overcome is distrust.
Publicity about failures and the predominance of non-profits in the field
make some prospects wary of abuse and profiteering by developers. This
perception problem should ease as adequately-financed and well-managed
proprietary projects become more common. Different marketing
techniques, such as cultivation of referral networks among community
organizations, require special expertise in marketing congregate and CCRC
projects. Combined with traditional, advertising-based methods the result is
very high marketing costs, often $4,000-$5,000 per unit even for rentals.
The marketing difficulties have a substantial effect on the length of project
startup. In most areas it takes 18 to 36 months to fully sell or rent all units.
Since expenses outpace revenues during this period, a large deficit results and
must be funded. Startup deficits are a more significant part of retirement
center development costs than in other housing development. The start up
losses greatly increase equity requirements under some financing
alternatives. This is the final development cost that must be funded before
normal operation begins, and a new set of "extraordinary" costs ensues.
4. EXTRAORDINARY OPERATING COSTS
After development and startup, the operation of continuing care housing
introduces more considerations which distinguish the product from other
real estate development. This section describes some of the financial and
management implications that result from high service levels, the maturation
process of the community, and the nursing subsidy. This section also reviews
the basis for actuarial pricing.
Service Levels. The high levels of service in CCRC's require managing
more personnel than most real estate developers are used to, and managing
with considerable sensitivity to social concerns of residents. It is not unlike
hotel management. A 200 unit, full service congregate might employ 50-60
people full time. A two hundred unit CCRC might employ over 100 people. 5
For developers who do not have the expertise, outside managers can be hired.
5 Laventhol and Horwath, based on median of 2.6 residents per employee.
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Good management is essential to retain residents through such attractions as
delicious food. Management practice can also play a role in such expenses as
resident transfers to nursing or assisted living units.
But even good management can not resolve a number of inherent operating
risks. The costs of the services are passed on to residents, but the number of
services increases the number of variables leading to operating cost
increases. Nursing care itself has increased faster than inflation for the past
twenty years. Non-profit CCRC's have sometimes run into financial
difficulty because they did not raise fees fast enough. Over time there must
be flexibility in the ability to increase fees. Large fee increases raise the
possibility of outpacing residents' incomes and forcing some residents to
move out or be subsidized. Since evicting seniors is undesirable, financial
subsidy should be an option. Financing should allow for a financial aid
reserve, or a mechanism for putting liens against entrance fee refunds.
Community Maturation. Local market risks can affect revenues as with
any real estate development, although competition is likely to be a greater
threat than local economic downturns, since entering residents usually do not
work. However, one characteristic affects the operating stability of CCRC's
that is somewhat unique. This is the long period of maturation of a
community before resident turnover and nursing utilization stabilize, and the
risk that they will never stabilize. When communities open their doors, the
initial group of residents tends to be in the same age cohort of 75-80. Yet life
expectancy after entering a CCRC is 12-14 years. 6 (It is about 10 years if
living independently. Whether the differential is due to resident
characteristics or CCRC environments has not been studied.) Thus there
should be little mortality, and little turnover, for some time. One assumption
often used is that attrition will increase one percent a year until it stabilizes at
eight percent of all units in the eighth year, assuming full occupancy.
However, variability in mortality and morbidity can cause fluctuating
attrition rates.
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6 Winklevoss, p. 93-95.
The effect of the increasing turnover can vary depending on the project. If a
project achieves full occupancy after startup and can cultivate a waiting list, it
can resell or rent vacated units with little difficulty. If not, then the vacancy
rate will increase and marketing will become a greater expense. Turnover
maturation will effect cash flow where entrance fees from new residents are
a significant part of income, this income will be scarce in the early years of a
community if turnover rises slowly.
Nursing Subsidies. The slow maturation of the resident population also
effects nursing center operations. The nursing centers of CCRC's (and to a
lesser extent the assisted care units of congregates and CCRC's) are subject to
slowly increasing utilization rates. They are also subject to high variability
in utilization. This unstability can have several consequences. First, since
most CCRC's guarantee that nursing beds will be available for residents
whenever they need them, it is necessary to build for the maximum
anticipated need, usually one nursing bed per four or five independent living
units. Since full utilization occurs, if at all, only after the long maturation
period, the CCRC operator must fill the nursing center with non-resident
patients during this time. This introduces additional management and
revenue issues. Second, and most important, high utilization rates raise costs
for the community to the extent that the nursing or assisted care is is being
subsidized. When utilization is unstable, so are project expenses.
Actuarial Pricing. The subsidies of residents who need nursing or assisted
care take the form of debiting entrance and monthly fees for nursing care at
less than cost. As subsidies from within the project, the project is in effect a
form of self-insurance. The problem for CCRC's is that it is hard to price
them the way insurance should be priced---actuarially. Most insurance is
priced based on actuarial predictions of beneficiaries' needs, and it covers
enough beneficiaries to render the pricing reasonably adequate. A CCRC
usually has fewer than 400 residents; this is so small a sample that its needs
could greatly differ from the actuarial predictions. The pricing for the
nursing care component should be based on actuarial predictions for the
particular residents covered by the program.7 The price should be equal to
7 ibid., pp. 75-203 discuss actuarial argument.
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the facility's actuarial liability, which is the present value of the future
expenses for residents. Actuarial miscalculations, or lack of calculations,
have led to the failures of several low-cost facilities which were
undercapitalized. Such actuarial pricing could be either "open-group,"
whereby fees are set to cover all resident nursing care expenses for a set
period, or "closed-group," whereby fees are set to cover a particular cohort
of residents for their lives. Both methods would involve charging high fees
initially in order to build up a reserve to pay for later health care utilization.
In practice, however, such pricing is not widely used, and it is unlikely that
proprietary developers will undertake it themselves. Pricing for nursing
care as well as the housing units is based instead on the traditional "real
estate" method, determined by variables such as construction costs, the fair
market price, and the amount of competition. Developers make assumptions
about future utilization rates, and accept the operating risk that these
assumptions may understate utilization. Setting standard fees on a hybrid
basis (real estate for the housing and actuarial for the nursing care) seems
appropriate. But actuarial pricing, however much it is justified, is likely to
be too complex for individual developers to use for various cohorts of
incoming residents. Developers increasingly hire actuarial consultants who
advise on what future costs will be. As noted however, CCRC's are so small
that using non-resident-specific actuarial data leaves much room for
variation and increased cost. It is financially risky.
Alternative Risk Reduction. To limit operating risks without actuarial
pricing, most projects establish large reserve funds to cover contingencies.
Another way to limit the risk, which has become a trend in the industry, is to
sharply limit the amount of nursing care that is included in standard fees.
The original method of including unlimited care has frequently given way to
limiting free nursing care to a set number of days and thereafter charging on
a per-diem basis. Some projects go even farther, and price all nursing care
on a fee-for-service basis. However, a hybrid pricing structure is likely to
develop as insurance companies provide long-term care coverage for
retirement housing residents which developers might purchase for residents
at group rates. Such insurance is offered by a few companies now, but most
current policies have limited usefulness because of low reimbursement rates
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and other restrictions. However, insurance companies, by assuming the
actuarial risks, may eventually relieve developers of this particular
operating obstacle.
This chapter has outlined the product complexity, regulatory, development
cost, and operating cost characteristics that make continuing care unusual and
difficult. These obstacles are not insurmountable. They do constitute a
battery of issues that financing must take account of. Chapter 4 reviews how
CCRC's in general accommodate some of these issues.
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Choices in Pricing and Project
Financing
The panoply of financing alternatives for CCRC's involves two types of
issues: retail pricing and project debt and equity financing. Making a choice
is complicated because it must be informed not only by financial returns
delivered, but by the regulatory and cost issues described in Chapter 3. This
chapter presents financing issues in more detail. Part A outlines various
options regarding fee structuring. Then Part B discusses the most common
methods of project debt financing.
PART A: Fee Structure Alternatives
The choice of project financing generally must follow the decision of what
the fee structure will be. That structure, whether it is an entrance plus
monthly fee, a condo/coop purchase plus monthly fee, or entirely a monthly
rental, will determine how much debt and equity financing is needed. The
different structures have varying economic implications for the buyers
themselves, and varying levels of marketability, which will affect the
successful startup of a project.
While the "first wave" of continuing care projects guaranteed unlimited
nursing care, the "second wave" has responded to actuarial risk by limiting
care. The "third wave" is completely fee-for-service. Much current
development attention is focussed on the third-wave type of product and on
congregates which, if they offer any long-term care options, do so through
affiliations with off-site providers. Yet the CCRC with unlimited care is a
unique product with considerable underlying demand. Where it is possible to
finance projects to allow this structure, at the very least the developer should
accrue the advantages of a marketing edge.
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1. ENTRANCE AND MONTHLY FEE STRUCTURE
Historically most CCRC's have used a combination of entrance and monthly
fees. The entrance fee buys entitlement to services and shelter but is not like
a fee simple real estate purchase. This is a difficult ownership vehicle to
market since most prospects are unfamiliar with it; in fact it may be unique to
retirement center housing. Early lifecare projects gave no refund on
entrance fees when residents died or left the facility, and often promised
unlimited nursing care. The failure or default of a number of
undercapitalized early projects has made many consumers wary of projects
with entrance fees. Aside from finding it difficult to pay for unlimited
nursing care, early sponsors found that prospects and their children did not
like reducing their estates. Subsequent projects have refunded entrance fees
on some vesting basis (eg 1% amortizing to the facility per month of
occupancy) or at flat percentage rates, and sometimes limited nursing care in
return. Refunding entrance fees creates a tax problem because the refunded
portion is then construed as a loan under I.R.S. rules, obligating the resident
to pay taxes on imputed interest. Under a special 1985 law, residents of
CCRC's are exempt from imputed interest on the first $90,000 of the refund.
A number of conditions on the facility apply.1 The immediate effect of
refunding entrance fees is to raise the price that projects must charge to meet
the future refund liability. Refunding entrance fees increases the price by up
to 50%. One advantage of fee structures with an initial, refundable payment
is that should the resident later become indigent, the refund liability can be a
source of reimbursement to the facility. When the refund is exhausted,
Medicaid can be used in qualified facilities. With all fee alternatives,
residents can deduct the portion of their fees that subsidize health care
operations.
From the developer's perspective, entrance fees give flexibility in project
financing. They can be used initially as a permanent take-out (resident
financing), or they can be invested in a trust to yield revenue for debt service.
1The resident must be entitled to lifetime tenancy, be entitled to long-term care, and begin
tenancy in an independent living unit. More significant for developers are the requirements
that the long-term care be provided at substantially no additional cost and that all
components of the project be owned by the same entity.
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A problem with the investment alternative is negative arbitrage; the debt
interest rate, unless tax-exempt bonds are used, is likely to exceed the yield
rate. Investing the funds also introduces the necessity for investment
responsibility, which is usually a nonexistent or minor part of real estate
management. A further problem with refundable entrance fees is that they
create a future liability. If used as a permanent take-out, then refunds are
dependent on repurchase of units. If invested, and the revenue stream is
assigned to the debt service, then funds are nearly as illiquid. Furthermore,
high yields usually require long-term investment which also creates
illiquidity. An advantage of entrance fees is that more flexibility in revenue
increases is possible; gains can be derived from entrance fee or monthly fee
increases. This flexibility is subject to adequate unit turnover, of course. A
tax consideration related to imputed interest is that only the non-refunded
portion of the entrance fee is treated as current income; the rest is a loan and
as such it is not subject to tax treatment as current income. Fee structures
with upfront payments make it easier to lock in presales, psychologically if
not legally, with 10% deposit requirements that are due with purchase and
sale agreements. Preleasing in rental projects does less to prevent kick-outs.
At least one alternative to the entrance fee has been used to escape the
imputed interest problem. This involves characterizing entrance fees as
"memberships" and not guaranteeing repurchase but guaranteeing assistance
to the purchaser in reselling it. Current lobbying efforts in Congress may
succeed in raising the imputed interest threshold and render the issue moot
for most projects.
2. CONDOMINIUM OR COOPERATIVE OWNERSHIP
Although common with most other housing types, condominium and
cooperative fee structures are just beginning to play a role in continuing care
centers. They solve several problems for residents and developers.
Residents easily understand condo and usually coop types of ownership. This
makes marketing considerably easier. As with an entrance fee, developers
usually guarantee buyback of the unit. Residents also derive the tax
advantages of home ownership, which may or may not be useful for seniors
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in their seventies. 2 Imputed interest may not be a problem depending on
I.R.S. interpretations. Condos (and coops to a lesser extent) have a greater
chance of receiving financing than entrance fees. This is less significant for
residents themselves, who are unlikely to finance their purchases, as for third
parties such as children who may finance the purchase for the resident. If
condo or coop ownership can attract younger residents by presenting the
upfront fee as more of a real estate investment, it would be apparent in lower
initial health care utilization.
For the developer, a condo or coop structure coupled with substantial
monthly fees has several advantages. As with a rental structure, it may
exempt the facility from state regulation. It is especially appropriate in
instances where nursing is provided on a fee-for-service basis without
subsidy by initial payments. The unit sales would normally function as a
permanent take-out of construction financing, although they could be used to
fund debt service. Unit repurchases are dependant on resales, and developers
may make them contractually contingent on a resale. One of the biggest
problems with condos or coops is how the developer can maintain operating
control. If the developer is liable for unit repurchase, it will want to ensure
that the facility is maintained and managed well. Furthermore, residents may
not be in a position to assume operating control themselves. With condos,
operating control may not be possible in states where condo owners are
entitled to run owner's associations. If the project is sited on a leasehold
(which may not be possible in some states), then a developer who is the leasor
can exercise rudimentary control over the property through the leasehold.
The leasehold may be the only ongoing revenue benefiting the developer
unless it also manages the project.
Coops offer more flexibility in retaining operating control. A coop purchase
conveys two interests which cannot be separated: stock in the facility
corporation, and a proprietary lease on a particular unit. To maintain
operating control, the stock can be issued in two classes; the developer retains
the class with voting control, while residents get the class with financial
benefits if any accrue. A drawback of this arrangement is that it disqualifies
2 For example, $125,000 capital gains exclusion can be deferred.
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coop members for homeowning tax benefits under current I.R.S. rules. For
the developer, condo sales and possibly coop sales under this structure will
eliminate eligibility for depreciation of the facility.
3. THE ALL-RENTAL FACILITY
A fee structure consisting entirely of monthly fees is most common in
congregates, and infrequent in CCRC's because higher costs require
extremely high monthly fees. Renting leaves control of assets with the
resident; the renter can invest his or her assets to generate income for the
fees, rather than forfeiting the assets to the developer. Liquidity for the
resident is high. A marketing drawback of rental projects, which may not be
as important as the advantage of liquidity, is that most prospects are usually
homeowners and renting may be viewed as step down in housing status.
Renting also eliminates ownership tax advantages which may or may not be
important to elderly buyers in their seventies. Marketing congregates is
presumably easier with a rental structure. For CCRC's, the marketing
advantages are questionable.
For the developer, a rental structure has an effect on project start up,
operating risk and financing options. Rental projects are generally exempt
from state regulations that apply to entrance-fee projects. The resident's
control of assets introduces the danger that the assets will decline in value,
requiring a financial subsidy for the resident to remain in the center.
Without a refund liability due to the resident, however, such a subsidy is not
readily available unless funded by a reserve. Another possibility in some
locations, given the political sensitivity of rent levels for the elderly, is the
imposition of rent control. With no future income coming from entrance
fees or unit sales, rent control would affect revenues most with a rental
structure. A rental fee structure forces the developer to secure outside,
third-party financing unless it uses its own equity for all project costs.
TABLE 4-1 summarizes some of the issues discussed for each fee structure.
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TABLE 4-1: CHARACTERISTICS OF DIFFERENT FEE STRUCTURES
All- Entrance
Rental Fee* Condo* Coop**
RESIDENT CONSIDERATIONS:
Resident retains control of assets YES NO NO NO
Familiarity/marketing advantage YES NO YES MAYBE
Lowest upfront cost YES NO NO NO
Possible financing of purchase NO NO YES MAYBE
Homeowning tax advantages NO NO YES NO
Imputed interest charges NO YES MAYBE MAYBE
DEVELOPER CONSIDERATIONS:
Comprehensive state regulation NO MAYBE NO NO
Developer has operating control YES YES NO YES
Property depreciable YES YES NO MAYBE
Requires outside debt financing YES NO NO NO
Initial startup revenue NO YES YES YES
Most effective presale NO YES YES YES
Investment manage.(with trust) NO YES NO YES
Most sensitive to rent control YES NO NO NO
Some non-taxable revenue NO YES MAYBE MAYBE
Long-term liabilty to resident NO YES YES YES
Use of liens as financial subsidy NO YES YES YES
*With refund/repurchase obligations
**With repurchase obligation and dual stock structure
PART B: Sources of Debt Financing
Developers may finance a CCRC without permanent debt, as when they use
entrance fees or unit sales for permanent take-out of construction financing
("resident financing".) But when it is necessary or decided to use permanent
debt, a number of sources have historically been available for retirement
centers, albeit with varying degrees of frequency. Choosing financing for a
particular project, however, may not be a choice at all. Project specific
constraints, such as operating income and the cost of debt, may eliminate
some choices. Underwriting restrictions will eliminate other sources.
Finally, as with other real estate investments, the availability of a particular
type of debt centers on a key issue: how much equity the developer has or can
obtain. Even when the developer has equity of its own, it probably wants to
minimize its investment. When equity is not on hand, equity financing must
be secured, or debt financing used that completely covers costs. The latter is
usually possible only for non-profit sponsors.
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The types debt available generally come from two sources: conventional
mortgage financing and bonds. Bonds are available as taxable or tax-exempt
instruments, and may be rated or unrated. The remainder of this chapter
discusses these in greater detail.
1. CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE FINANCING
Conventional financing from banks, savings and loans, and other financial
institutions presents two major problems for congregates as well as
continuing care centers: availability and equity requirements. The
retirement center concept is frequently unfamiliar to lenders, and usually
perceived as highly risky. Whereas bond financing reduces risk to the
investors with reserve requirements and insurance, banks and savings and
loans tend to avoid high risk projects altogether. Retirement centers are
perceived as heavily dependent on management expertise. Lenders feel that
mismanagement of marketing and operations in these "service-enriched"
projects can lead to project failure more readily than with most types of real
estate. Whereas normally the underlying real estate constitutes adequate
collateral, the highly specialized nature of retirement centers means that they
are illiquid assets in case of project foreclosure. Furthermore, the prospect
of evicting elderly residents from a foreclosed project obviously discourages
lenders. Some lenders may fear that courts will expand tenant rights in case
of foreclosure. Some also fear rent control. Conventional lending is -
increasing in availability, although lenders are setting more preconditions on
projects , such as presales.
Lenders will usually fund up to 70%-80% of the value of projects. Required
equity on typical projects can be anywhere from $2 million to over $10
million, which can be syndicated by proprietary developers. The advantages
of conventional financing include lower financing fees than with bonds,
lower reserve funds, lower ongoing fees, and faster processing time since the
loan is negotiated directly with the lender. But disadvantages are significant,
including high rates relative to tax-exempt bonds and sometimes taxable
bonds. A range of debt variations such as participation and convertible
mortgages is theoretically possible, although in some cases project cash flow
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is inappropriate for such arrangements. Chapter 7 discusses this issue
further.
Another problem with conventional mortgages is that terms are usually 10-
15 years. This means a risk of refinancing at higher rates.
2. BOND FINANCING
For non-profit CCRC's and congregates, the choice of debt financing is
enhance by a wide selection of taxable and tax-exempt bonds. For
proprietary CCRC's, bonds are more problematic. Bonds offer an
opportunity to invest relatively little equity, sometimes as little as 10% for
proprietary developers or no equity for non-profits. But the price paid is
high upfront fees. Bonds function as construction loans as well as permanent
financing, so closing on a bond is at the commencement of construction. This
means that interest must be paid on the bond during the construction period,
although the bond proceeds can be invested to earn income. But in most cases
the income will be less that the interest, and this negative arbitrage is an
additional development costs. Bonds also require high debt service reserves,
and various other reserves. They also entail issuance costs of about 1%, and
unrated bonds can carry very high discounts rates. These costs are funded by
the bond itself, notwithstanding equity requirements, but the total debt that
must be serviced rises commensurately. A project financed with an unrated
bond would have considerably higher debt service than if financed with a
conventional mortgage, assuming both had the same interest rate. Even with
a lower debt coverage ratio, higher rents or fees would be necessary to yield
adequate income for the debt service. Thus conventional mortgages would
usually be the preferred financing choice but for two reasons: borrowers
may not be able to meet the equity requirements, and tax-exempt bonds offer
lower interest rates and longer terms.
Tax-Exempt Bonds. Although the outlook for private purpose tax-
exempt bonds is questionable due to pending tax reform legislation, these
bonds have recently been the most common means of financing congregate
and continuing care centers. Tax-exempts are issued, but not guaranteed, by
states, cities or authorities such as housing agencies. The bonds most readily
41
available for retirement centers are multifamily housing revenue bonds.
They have been ideally suited to the non-profit sponsors who have dominated
the industry, since for them the bonds can cover 100% of hard and soft costs
including equipment and underwriting fees. Long-term equity is not
normally required. For proprietary developers 90% of total project costs
can be financed. (Underwriters, however, require substantial presales,
usually 50%, which itself requires putting $500,000-$1,000,000 at risk.)
Unrated tax-exempt bonds may have terms of up to 30 years, which is longer
than unrated taxable bonds but shorter than the term available with the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance program described below
for congregate rentals.
When tax-exempt multifamily housing revenue bonds are used by
proprietary developers, federal regulations require renting 20% of units to
moderate income groups, in effect subsidizing them with the remaining 80%
of units. Moderate income groups are defined as those with incomes 80% of
market area medians. The precise requirements may change with tax
reform. In areas with high median incomes, such as parts of California, this
scarcely affects revenues of most rental projects. It also applies only to the
rental portion of fees; a separate "service" fee can be charged per resident
above the rent. But for proprietary CCRC's with upfront fees, the below-
market units can strongly effect project financials.
Non-rated bonds are secured only by the project itself, sometimes with
assignment of leases, and thus are risky in investment eyes. As such they
require higher interest rates, and are bought for yield rather than for
investment security. Unrated bonds are also less marketable; unless placed
privately they are sold on the "junk" market. In a few instances it may be
possible to privately place a bond with a local financial institution that has
some interest in a project (eg community reinvestment goals.) Generally,
however, to make bonds more marketable the credit of other institutions can
be purchased. Credit enhancement also reduces the interest rate and the bond
discount fee. Private letters of credit (LOC's) from banks or savings and
loans, sometimes backed by other institutions such as insurance firms, are
rarely used by themselves for retirement centers because of upfront cost and
annual fees.
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FHA mortgage insurance programs are less expensive and more common,
although available now only to congregates and nursing homes. Section 232-
programs insure nursing homes and personal care facilities. Section 221.d-
insures "Retirement Service Centers," defined as all rental, service-enriched
projects with unit kitchens and baths, that target seniors over 70. The
program requires six months of debt service to be maintained for 24 months
or until stabilization. The rental stipulation excludes any continuing care -
project with an upfront fee, and at this time rating agencies do not rate
endowment facilities although private insurance is available. The program
provides insures up to 90% of proprietary project costs (Section 221.d.4) and
100% of non-profit costs (Section 221.d.3). Tax reform may redefine what
total project costs may cover, which would effectively increase equity
requirements. This credit enhancement program, since its 1983
introduction, has become the primary means of facilitating congregate
financing. It is currently the only very long term (40 year maturity and
amortization) fixed rate insurance program available for retirement centers.
Disadvantages are that "prevailing"wages are required during construction,
which generally means union rates, and the long processing time. Obtaining
the insurance through one of the several authorized co-insurers expedites the
process, but entails another fee as well as extra annual insurance premiums.
To make the bonds investment-grade ratable by Standard & Poors or
Moody's, a LOC is privately obtained to cover the short fall between the FHA
guarantee on 99% of the debt and 100% of the debt.
Taxable Bonds. Taxable bonds have not been used frequently for
retirement centers. Unrated taxable bonds carry high interest rates and
usually have very short terms (eg as short as 7 years). Their amortization
period is also shorter than for other types (eg 25 years). They do allow for
very little equity. In instances where tax-exempt bonds are not available
because of state statute, limits on issues, or cumbersome procedures, taxable
bonds may be the only alternative short of conventional mortgages.
Private LOC's or the FHA insurance programs can be combined with
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnae Mae) taxable bonds to
make them ratable, which results in a lower interest rate closer to that of
unrated tax-exempt bonds.
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Theoretically any of the fee structures outlined in Part A can be used with
any of the debt types in Part B. For proprietary CCRC's, however, the
below-market stipulations of tax-exempt bonds and the associated upfront
expenses make them an unlikely choice. The lack of a Federal insurance
program for CCRC's also makes rated tax-exempt and taxable bonds difficult
to obtain. Conventional financing is most likely the debt source until further
alternatives develop.
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The Curriculum Vitae of a CCRC:
A Case Study of "Ashford"
This chapter focuses on a proprietary CCRC now in the early development
stage, pseudonymously called "Ashford" in this paper, to illustrate how one
retirement-center developer has handled development obstacles and
approached financing. The quantitative data about Ashford is hypothetical,
representing a typical project, but closely resembles the actual facility. Based
on this empirical analysis of one project, financing recommendations are
made.
The chapter begins with Part A which reviews the the history of the project
and its current status. Part B then concentrates on cost factors and profit
centers, including the following: development costs; income and expenses
streams from residential, nursing and resale operations; and future liability
incurred by refund and health care obligations. The discussion on refund and
nursing liability attempts to quantify the costs of these CCRC risks.
PART A: Development Decisions and Hurdles
This section presents an overview of Ashford:
- The origin of the project and the partners involved
- Determination of the program (the type of facility and services provided)
- Design decisions, cost issues and zoning approval
- Marketing considerations
- Operating considerations
- State regulation
1. BACKGROUND
Ashford will be located in metropolitan Boston, Massachusetts. It is a joint
venture between three entities. One is a local non-profit health care
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corporation, another a national firm with development and operating
experience in acute-care hospitals and nursing homes, and the third a national
developer whose main office is in the Boston area. The national health care
firm has begun CCRC development elsewhere in country. Despite the
involvement of the non-profit partner, Ashford is entirely planned as a
proprietary, profit-making endeavor. The motivations of each partner, aside
from making money, are slightly different. The non-profit health care
group is interested in a facility for outplacement of certain patients who need
a continuing care facility, in diversification of its activities and in a profit
center that will make a contribution toward supporting its money-losing
operations. The national hospital and nursing home company is interested in
diversification into a related field as well as profit. The locally-based
national developer was the last party to enter the deal, which the non-profit
requested to provide local development experience to the team. For this
developer, the project is a chance to diversify and expand its residential
operations which historically have been a small part of the company.
Management of the development process and of the facility during operations
is going to be shared among the entities depending on expertise in a given
area. Currently the partners plan to contribute and benefit equally from
Ashford. Notwithstanding a change in the deal structure and separate
development and management fees, they will split equity, cash flow and tax
benefits equally. (An exception to this has been the purchase of land by the
national health-care firm.) Tax benefits may be minimal after the 1986 tax
reform, but two of the partners have relatively little need for tax benefits
anyway. The non-profit cannot use them, and the national health care
developer is a publicly traded firm for which paper losses can depress
reported net income. The third firm is a private partnership which can
benefit the most from tax shelter. The project at this point is proceeding on
the basis of pretax, "economic" considerations only, with no major decisions
based on tax effects on the joint venture.
2. DETERMINING THE PROGRAM
From the start Ashford was planned as a continuing care facility with nursing
services rather than some other type of elderly housing such as a congregate.
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The health care experience of two of the joint venture partners obviously
influenced this decision. The site chosen is an 80-acre parcel surrounded by
an established, relatively affluent area. A market analyst suggested a
relatively deep market for continuing care because Massachusetts currently
has few CCRC's. While some "Rustbelt" cities, such as Philadelphia and
Minneapolis, have many facilities which make competition a major factor in
feasibility, the partners felt that the dearth of competition in Boston would
make it easy to reach a capture rate of the eligible market that would sustain
the project, about 1%-3%. Allowing for some competition, this is lower than
the 5% overall capture rate considered realizable. Prices will make Ashford
an upscale project affordable to the upper middle class, with qualifying
income at about $25,000 per year plus unit prices well over $100,000. While
such economic status is far above the norm in national terms (see Chapter 2),
it is less unusual in the affluent market area surrounding the project.
Massachusetts has three operating CCRC's, one of which is close to Ashford
and now has at least a three-year waiting list after opening in 1984. Two
proprietary congregates also exist. Several new CCRC's are in very early
development stages, but the developers expect, with characteristic optimism,
to have the competitive edge for about five years.
In the hypothetical model of Ashford, there are 270 independent living units
(ILU'S), 30 assisted living units (ALU'S) and a 60-bed nursing center. The
developers do not plan future expansion of the 300 living units, although
eventually they will expand the nursing center to 120 beds contingent on
various approvals. Thus unlike the nursing centers in many CCRC's, this one
is intended to serve a large proportion of outside patients indefinitely. The
living units are to be built in two phases, with construction on the second
phases commencing about two years after construction on the first. This
should reduce construction financing costs, allow savings by building some
common amenities after initial sales, and allow better utilization of the
assisted care units which will not be built until the second phase. This paper
will not focus on the phasing in order to better compare financing
alternatives.
For marketing and in some cases regulatory reasons, the developers have
decided to offer the fullest selection of services generally found in CCRC's.
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Entrance will guarantee unlimited nursing care without additional charge,
and other health services will include health maintenance such as "wellness"
programs. Standard fees will also include the typical meal services,
housekeeping, linen, activities, and transportation. The main option will be
additional meals beyond the one daily meal included in the monthly fee.
3. GETTING OFF THE GROUND: DESIGN DEVELOPMENT,
COST CONTROL AND ZONING APPROVAL
Ashford is now in design development with a team that includes a consultant
in elderly housing in addition to the architectural firm. Much effort is going
into determining the visual character of the facility. A goal of the developers
is to achieve a non-institutional, residential character similar to a small resort
hotel which will give Ashford a marketing edge. The design is also taking
into account the special social and physical needs of the elderly. From a cost
and financing standpoint, a key design consideration is the amount of
common area and the mix of unit types. The table below shows the overall
size of the facility, not including the nursing center. (Full space analysis is
APPENDIX TABLE 1.)
TABLE 5-1: ASHFORD SIZE
Units Mix Total Sq Ft
ILU's 270 90% 232,875
ALU's 30 10% 13.500
Totall 300 100% 246,375
Common Area 30,450
Circulation (20%) 55,365
TotalArea 332,190
In the mix there are no studio-sized ILU's and there is a 50% proportion of 2
bedroom units. The high number of two bedrooms reflects a marketing
decision, based in part on the experience of the nearby CCRC, that larger
units are the best sellers. No studios will be offered except for ALU's. One
effect of this high proportion is to increase building profit, since the two
bedroom units carry a higher profit per square foot.
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The common area includes lounges, a library, a clubroom, a conference
room and auditorium; concessions such as a convenience store and a beauty
shop; craft and exercise areas; and administrative, dining and housekeeping
facilities. With circulation, these add about 36,000 square feet to the project
(11% of total area), or over $2 million in construction costs. The nursing
center occupies additional area, nearly as large as the common amenities.
The site, although large, has relatively few buildable acres, at most 25% of
the total. Difficult site conditions, due in part to steep grade, will mandate
high site improvement costs. Since most of the site is unbuildable, it will be
dedicated to conservation usage, for which the developers will receive tax
benefits as with a charitable contribution. While access would be easiest
from an adjacent office parcel, a marketing decision to access the site through
a residential area will also raise site costs by requiring additional road
construction. The developers have obtained special zoning for the project,
which was zoned for commercial usage. The commercial zoning was
amended to include the CCRC mix of institutional and residential uses.
Parking spaces will be built at a ratio of about half a space per unit. Because
the project is proprietary, it will pay full real estate taxes, and the developers
stressed this consideration when seeking the zoning amendment.
4. CLOSING THE DEAL: MARKETING PROGRAM
Ashford will be an upfront fee project (ie, it will require an entrance fee or
unit purchase), and the developers have set an goal of 50% presales during
the preconstruction period of eight to twelve months. Given the slow
absorption rates of retirement centers, this pace of sales seems extremely
ambitious. From a cost standpoint, it also requires a large outlay of equity
which will be "at risk." Until now, funds spent for design schematics and
zoning changes have come out of a small startup fund, and a further $1.6
million has been spent on land. During the preconstruction period, however,
considerable soft cost expenditure will be necessary for such items as
architecture and engineering commissions, legal and consulting fees,
development fees and taxes. (These are assumed to be over $1.7 million in
the proforma.) At Ashford, the developers expect to be able to finance some
of this. But in a typical project, several million dollars (including land costs
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and startup fund) would be necessary in at-risk equity before presales reach
the 50% hurdle level and construction financing assumes payment of costs.
Beginning the presales campaign earlier before the preconstruction period
would reduce the riskyness of these funds. In other projects, the initial equity
could also be syndicated to transfer risk to investors.
Some final decisions about the project remain to be made before marketing
can begin. A key one is what form of ownership the project will offer.
Initially planning an entrance fee project, currently the developers favor a
cooperative ownership structure to improve marketability for the reasons
discussed in Chapter 4 and for regulatory reasons. The fee levels would not
change with this ownership structure, although the change has financial
consequences for both the developers and the residents.
5. REDUCING OPERATING RISKS: REFUNDS AND NURSING
Refunds. The two major operating risks discussed in Chapter 3 are
unpredictability in the turnover and the nursing utilization rates. Ashford's
developers have tentatively decided to make unit refunds or repurchases
conditional on "availability of funds." This means that when a resident dies
or decides to leave, return of the refundable portion of his or her purchase
price (tentatively set at 90%) will be contingent on resale of the property, or
on availability of facility funds held in a reserve or trust. This may hurt
marketability of the project if prospects feel that resales will be difficult in
the future. Resale sluggishness cannot be ruled out; while current facilities
have long waiting lists, future competition could drive the CCRC resale
market closer to the softness of the condominium resale market that exists in
many overbuilt areas. Another danger is that prices could deflate to make
full return of funds difficult even with resale. Establishing a high reserve
fund could resolve fears of repayment, but no matter how high the fund it
would be subject to volatile turnover. For example, an economically feasible
fund could not cover a mass exodus of residents. The marketing drawback of
not guaranteeing repurchase or refund is only a potential drawback,
however. If prospects do not have a long-term outlook or if they trust the
developers, it may not materialize at all. For the developers, not
guaranteeing return of funds substantially lessons future liability. The
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reduction in risk may make financing sources more forthcoming. The
tradeoff is that marketability may decline and and hurt sales.
Nursing Care. The other major uncertainty particular to continuing care
operations is the potential volatility of nursing care utilization. At Ashford,
the developers could not reduce risk as other operators have by limiting the
nursing care guarantee. To obtain the Massachusetts Determination of Need
(DON) certificate for the nursing center, it was necessary to guarantee the
nursing care at no additional cost (see State Regulation section below).
Furthermore, with an entrance fee structure (not a cooperative), limiting
nursing care would risk loss of the Federal imputed interest exemption.
Tentative prices for Ashford have not been arrived at in part or whole with
actuarial analysis, at levels that will fund the prevent value of future actuarial
liability. Rather the developers have set prices based wholly on real estate
criteria: a markup on construction costs and competitive rates. The
developers thus have two options to subsidize nursing care, short of
subsidizing it out of their own outside funds: they can make the project self-
insuring, or they can secure long-term care insurance. Initial inquiries into
the cost of long-term care insurance have found exorbitant rates, with
companies asking for approximately 10% of unit price as an upfront
payment, and then premiums of about $100 per month per unit. This is far
more than the projected cost for a community to subsidize residents under
typical utilization rates. Until long-term care insurers offer better prices,
self-insurance is the likely option. Its financial effects are reviewed in Part
B.
The ability to charge residents more for assisted care if they need it in their
unit or must move to an ALU is also hindered by guaranteeing care. Long-
term care insurance may cover assisted living, which otherwise is another
additional liability the developers must fund.
6. STATE REGULATION
Current Massachusetts restrictions on nursing home approval effectively
required guaranteeing nursing care. The developers received a DON under a
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special stipulation modifying the process required of CCRC nursing centers
to obtain the certificate. In turn, the stipulation required the developers to
guarantee nursing care and build a maximum of one nursing bed per five
living units (this is the ratio at Ashford). Otherwise the developers could
offer nursing services unbundled and eliminate much future liability.
Massachusetts does not now have comprehensive regulations on continuing
care centers themselves, although extensive legislation has been introduced in
the statehouse. Because the state does regulate condominiums and does not
regulate cooperatives in matters such as resident control, the use of a coop
structure at Ashford is more likely. Another state law requires that deposits
be held in escrow until closing. This prevents the developer from spending
the 10% deposits on construction before occupancy.
PART B: Breaking Out the Profit Centers
In a continuing care facility, there are five areas of development and
operations that potentially can generate profit for the developer:
1. Startup profits from selling units initially above cost.
2. Profits from reselling the units when they are vacated in the operating
life of a project.
3. Profits from operation of the housing units.
4. Profits from operation of the nursing center.
5. Income paid as development and management fees.
This paper will consider ways for proprietary developers to achieve a
sufficient return on startup, resale, residential and nursing operations with
minimal risk to themselves and the residents of the facility. It will not
consider developers' return from development and management fees, which
should be constant between financing alternatives. (At Ashford the three
joint venturers will share the development fee and the national health care
firm will hold the management contract.) The financial projections do
consider these fees in cost and expense assumptions.
As a preamble to discussing the financing options in Chapter 6, this section
will present the cost and expense data underlying the financial projections for
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the project. The data shown here comes from the resident financing option,
whereby upfront fees permanently take out the construction loan, but it
generally applies to all the financing options. First it will present the
relatively routine items of development cost and residential operations.
Then, it will analyze in greater depth the complex areas of resales and
nursing in terms of revenues, expenses and future liabilities.
1. STARTUP REVENUES
The basis of fees in most CCRC's, except for those which are all rental
facilities, is for upfront purchase prices to cover the cost of construction, and
monthly fees to cover operating costs. Upfront costs may also be used for a
reserve or trust to fund future contingencies.
Ashford's projected total sales volume is $45,825,000, with an average sales
price of $152,750. Monthly fees range from $900 to $1500, with an average
of $1128 not counting double occupancy fees. Annual monthly fee revenue is
$4,059,000. The breakdown by unit type is as follows:
TABLE 5-2: ASHFORD PRICES
Monthly Annual Fee Sales
Number Reit Price Revenue Volume
INDEPENDENT UNITS:
ILU 1 BR A 60 $900 $125,000 $648,000 $7,500,000
ILU 1 BR B 75 $1000 $140,000 $900,000 $10,500,000
ILU 2 BR A 75 $1150 $175,000 $1,035,000 $13,125,000
ILU 2 BR B 60 $1300 $195,000 $936,000 $11,700,000
SUBTOTAL 270 $3,519,000 $42,825,000
ASSISTED UNITS:
ALU STUDIO 30 $1500 $100,000 $540,000 $3,000,000
TOTAL 300 $4,059,000 $45,825,000
AVERAGE $1128 $152,750
The total sales revenue includes a 17% gross margin, reflecting development
costs of $38,015,207 with the resident-financed alternative, a figurc that
changes with other alternatives to reflect construction financing and
origination fees. (See APPENDIX TABLE 2 for detailed costs.) The
structure cost of $60.00 per square foot reflects commercial quality
construction, high cost items such as elevators, and special design for seniors.
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The nursing center cost is regulated by the state and is a separate line item
costing $2,485,000. The development costs per se do not include startup
operating deficits, reserve funding or nursing insurance funding (if any),
since these are calculated in the returns for their respective profit centers.
Equity requirements vary with the financing alternatives. With resident
financing, there is no long-term equity requirement because there is a gross
building profit. However, costs in the startup year are over $4 million, and
this constitutes equity until returned by unit sales.
2. RESIDENTIAL OPERATIONS
Since Ashford will probably be a cooperative with developer control,
operations cash flow can accrue to the developer. Aside from the monthly
fee income, revenues of the residential units are supplemented by a double
occupancy fee of $350 per month for every second occupant of an apartment.
An average of 25% of the units are assumed to have two occupants. Expenses
for residential operations fall under three components: staffing, operating,
and dining. Staffing includes all facility personnel except those in dining
service and the nursing center (whose expenses are not included here).
About forty full-time equivalents are assumed in this category for Ashford .
Dining includes all meal-related expenses calculated at a fixed rate per
person, per day. Operating expenses are fixed, physical plant costs, with the
exception of the management fee which is tied to effective operating revenue.
The total for each category, per unit, is below (see APPENDIX TABLE 3
for detailed breakdown).
RESIDENTIAL EXPENSES PER UNIT, YEAR 1*
Staffing $200
Operating $468
Dietary $228
Total $897
Average Rent $1215
* With 100% occupancy
The expenses do not show the cost of the nursing subsidy or long-term care
insurance, which eventually can use up a large portion of the per unit surplus
indicated. TABLE 5-3 is a complete residential operations Droforma.
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TABLE 5-3: PROJECTED BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW...RESIDENTIAL OPERATIONS (RESIDENT-FINANCING)
YEAR:
INCOME:
1 ILU'S
2 ALU'S
DOUBLE OCCUPANCY
SERVICE FEE
MISC INCOME
INFLATION
0.0% 3,519,000
0.0% 540,000
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
POTENTIAL OPERATING REVENUE
VACANCY
LESS VACANCY
EFFECI'IVE OPERATING REVENUE
INTEREST INCOME
TOTAL REVENUE
EXPENSES:
NURSING SUBSIDY
PLUS VACANCY
STAFFING
OPERATING
PLUS VACANCY
DIETARY
PLUS VACANCY
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES
20 REPLACE. RESERVE @
21 NET OPERATING INCOME
22 DEBT SERVICE
23 PARTICIPATION
24 BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
NOTES:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000 3,519,000
540,000 540,000
4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000
315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000
351,000 351,000 -351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000
4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000
70.0% 22.5% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
(3,087,000) (992,250) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500)
1,323,000
0
1,323,000
(297,327)
208,129
0.0% (432,789)
0.0% (1,685,328)
438,019
0.0% (821,250)
574,875
(2,015,671)
[.50% (66,150)
3,417,750
0
3,417,750
(339,204)
76,321
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
59,535
(821,250)
184,781
(3,246,460)
(66,150)
4,189,500
80000
4,269,500
(381,081)
19,054
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,535,627)
(66,150)
4,189,500 4,189,500 4,189,500 4,189,500 4,189,500
80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000
4,269,500 4,269,500 4,269,500 4,269,500 4,269,500
(422,958)
21,148
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,575,411)
(66,150)
(464,835) (506,712)
23,242 25,336
(721,315) (721,315)
(1,685,328) (1,685,328)
13,230 13,230
(821,250) (821,250)
41,063 41,063
(3,615,194) (3,654,977)
(66,150) (66,150)
(548,589)
27,429
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,694,760)
(66,150)
(590,466)
29,523
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,734,543)
(66.150)
4,189,500
80,000
4,269,500
(632,343)
31,617
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,774,326)
(66,150)
4,189,500
80,000
4,269,500
(674,220)
33,711
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,814,109)
(66,150)
4,189,500
80,000
4,269,500
(716,097)
35,805
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,853,893)
(66,150)
4,189,500
80,000
4,269,500
(757,974)
37,899
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,893,676)
(66,150)
(758,821) 105,140 667,723 627,939 588,156 548,373 508,590 468,807 429,024 389,241 349,457 309,674
(758,821) 105,140 667,723 627,939 588,156 548,373 508,590 468,807 429,024 389,241 349,457 309,674
Figured at average double occupancy rate stated in assumptions. Actual rate would decline as community matures.
Total of reserve and trust income shown in TABLE 4.
From nursing subsidy in table TABLE 5. Also assumed equal to insurance premium if long term care insurance premium used.
Based on vacancy rate in Line 7
Staffing Year 1 only adjusted for vacancy (load of twice occupancy rate)
Vacancy on management fee only, except Year 1 where also adjusted for 50% of occupancy
Based on vacancy rate in Line 7
Figured on potential operating revenue
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
3
10
12
13
14
16
18
20
1
,
Occupancy. The financial projections assume that 60% of the units are
occupied by the end of the first year of operations, another 35% by the end of
the second year, and stabilized vacancy of 95%. (Assuming a balanced rate
of move-in during a given year, average occupancy rates are 30%, 77.5%
and 95% respectively.) These years of initial operation follow two years of
presales during startup and initial construction, which continues into the first
year of operations( Year 1). As with most real estate development, the
startup risk that full occupancy will be prolonged is present. However, this
startup risk is not examined except where particular financing structures are
particularly susceptible to it. Not counting interest income and the nursing
subsidy, breakeven occupancy and the operating expenses ratio are both
75%. With the nursing subsidy, they are 86%.
Inflation. In most of the analysis no inflation is assumed in order to analyze
the economic effects of items such as nursing subsidies that inflation might
hide. However, other scenarios with inflation are examined in sensitivity
analysis. Three kinds of inflation are considered to show varying effects on
the project in this analysis. Income inflation applies to all income except
upfront fees. Expense inflation applies to all operating expenses. Price
inflation applies to upfront fees; in effect it is the appreciation rate of the
units.
3. RESALE REVENUE AND REFUND LIABILITY
Unlike typical condominiums or other for-sale housing, in CCRC's the
developer remains involved with sales after the initial sell-out. This creates
potential for profit but also potential future liability, which is a major risk of
CCRC's. Within the resale arena, two variables determine financial impact:
turnover rates and repurchase policy. For residents, the objective is to
ensure that funds are likely to be available to pay for a refund, if in fact fees
are returned at all. This section will discuss resales at Ashford and how they
affect financial returns.
Turnover. The rule of thumb for CCRC's, which is assumed in the
analysis, is that turnover will increase one percentage point a year until
stabilizing at about 8% in the eighth year. While this assumption may
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underestimate turnover, especially in the early years, in being conservative it
does not exaggerate the return developers can gain from resales. In the
likelihood of price inflation, nominal returns would also be greater than
without inflation since sales volume would be larger. Should deflation of
entrance fee prices occur, however, increased turnover diminishes returns
and causes risk if refunds are due, as discussed in the Refund Policy section
below. TABLES 5-4 and 5-5 show resale income with no price inflation and
with 5% inflation respectively.
Without inflation, turnover volume reaches $3,666,000 when it stabilizes, or
8% of the original sales volume. With a 90% refund rate, 10% of this
volume accrues to the developer as current income, and the rest reverts to
former residents. (The developer's return is in fact slightly lower because
units must be refurbished, which is not expensed in the proforma.) In
inflationary times a spread develops that generates excess proceeds. The
distinction between current income and excess proceeds derives from the fact
that excess proceeds are a future liability payable to residents. Current
income receives tax treatment as such, and excess proceeds in some instances
are characterized as loans to the developer. In these respects the distinction is
an accounting one. However, the developer may use the two types of income
quite differently. In TABLE 5-5 the excess proceeds accrue to the reserve to
help its value keep up with inflation. (Incidentally, in this proforma the
reserve interest is assigned to residential operations cash flow. It could
revert to the reserve to further boost its real value.)
Since the developer cannot control turnover based on morbidity and
mortality for the most part (as opposed to turnover resulting from poor
management), it is risky to count on high turnover rates to eventually yield
profit or fund reserves. An additional factor, not analyzed, is that turnover
of the assisted care units may be much higher than the rest of the living units.
-1 " - rflt.- -1.r~ A -I - -- - I n^i,r P' 1
Refund Policy. Th iie ueveUpers of Ashlford plan to refund 90%1 of the
initial purchase price when residents die or decide to leave. This is becoming
a standard industry figure. The refund at Ashford, however, will not be
guaranteed by the developers. Should no money be available from within the
CCRC for refunds, this policy will mitigate risk of future liability on a
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TABLE 5-4: PROJECTED RESALE INCOME---0% PRICE INFLATION
YEAR:
POTENTIAL VALUE
TURNOVER
TURNOVER VALUE
REFUND % DISCNT @
REFUNDS DUE
RESALE PROCEEDS
RESALE INCOME@
EXCESS PROCEEDS
NF A TION
0.0% 45,825,000
0.0%
0
0.0% 90.0%
0
0
10.0% 0
0
45,825,000 45,825,000
1.0% 2.0%
458,250 916,500
90.0%
90.0% 90.0%
(412,425) (824,850)
45,825 91,650
45,825 91,650
0 0
45,825,00
3.0
1,374,75
90.0
(1,237,27
137,47
137,47
4 5 6 7 8 9
0 45,825,000 45,825,000 45,825,000 45,825,000 45,825,000
% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0%
0 1,833,000 2,291,250 2,749,500 3,207,750 3,666,000
5)
0
90.0% 90.0%
(1,649,700) (2,062,125)
183,300 229,125
183,300 229,125
0 0
90.0%
(2,474,550)
274,950
274,950
0
90.0%
(2,886,975)
320,775
320,775
0
90.0%
(3,299,400)
366,600
366,600
0
45,825,0
8.
3,666,0
90.
(3,299,4
366,6
366,6
9 RESERVE FUND
10 RESERVE INCOME @
11 TRUST VALUE
12 TRUST INCOME @
1
8.0%
tog off
8.0%
1~ P17Pnc~PPVP1rRIT~TVPAP 10t~i~
0 1,000,000 1,000,000
0 0 80,000
0
0
1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000
1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
80,000 80,000 80,000
1,000,000 1,000,000
80,000 80,000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
00%n 1000000
TABLE 5-5: PROJECTED RESALE INCOME ---5% PRICE INFLATION
YEAR: NFLATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 POTENTIAL VALUE 5.0% 45,825,000 48,116,250 50,522,063 53,048,166 55,700,574 58,485,603 61,409,883 64,480,377 67,704,396 71,089,615 74,644,096 78,376,301
2 TURNOVER 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0%
3 TURNOVER VALUE 0 481,163 1,010,441 1,591,445 2,228,023 2,924,280 3,684,593 4,513,626 5,416,352 5,687,169 5,971,528 6,270,104
94.7%
4 REFUND % DISCNT @ -5.0% 90.0% 85.5% 81.2% 77.2% 73.3% 69.6% 66.2% 62.9% 59.7% 56.7% 53.9% 51.2%
5 REFUNDS DUE 0 (411,394) (820,731) (1,228,019) (1,633,265) (2,036,477) (2,437,663) (2,836,830) (3,233,987) (3,225,902) (3,217,837) (3,209,792)
6 RESALEPROCEEDS 0 69,769 189,710 363,426 594,758 887,803 1,246,930 1,676,796 2,182,365 2,461,268 2,753,691 3,060,312
7 RESALE INCOME @ 10.0% 0 48,116 101,044 159,144 222,802 292,428 368,459 451,363 541,635 568,717 597,153 627,010
8 EXCESS PROCEEDS 0 21,652 88,666 204,282 371,956 595,375 878,471 1,225,433 1,640,730 1,892,551 2,156,538 2,433,301
9 RESERVE FUND 1 0 1,000,000 1,088,666 1,292,948 1,664,904 2,260,279 3,138,750 4,364,183 6,004,913 7,897,464 10,054,002 12,487,304
10 RESERVE INCOME @ 8.0% 0 0 87,093 103,436 133,192 180,822 251,100 349,135 480,393 631,797 804,320 998,984
13 PV RESERVF/RUST YEAR 10 @ 10.0% 5,295,836
1
2
4
6
7
8
00 11
00 13
NOTES:
All refunds based on 90% refund of purchase price
Represents market value of all fees in the aggregate
Based on turnover rates and growth stated in assumptions, TABLE 1. Maximum is 8% per year.
Decreasing percentage reflects appreciation of units which accrues to facility. Percentages based on future value of of original (90%)
discounted at the rate shown (the negative of the appreciation rate). THIS OVERESTIMATES THE EXCESS PROCEEDS because it does not take account of more
recent purchases. A adjustment factor was applied to reach the figures in the text.
Difference between turnover value and refunds due
Represents portion of turnover value which will not be refundable, and is current income
Difference between resale proceeds and resale income. Accrues to reserve fund or trust unless otherwise stated
Represents initial market value of retained fees plus excess proceeds
Discount rate matches rate of entrance fee inflation inflation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10 11
00 45,825,000
0% 8.0%
00 3,666,000
0% 90.0%
00) (3,299,400)
00 366,600
.00 366,600
0- 0
12
45,825,000
8.0%
3,666,000
90.0%
(3,299,400)
366,600
366,600
0
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recourse basis to the developer (or partnership) that would result with
deflation or a soft resale market. As a consequence the policy allows
potential profit from resales with no downside risk. The only cost to the
developer is marketability, and by no means is it certain that marketability
will even be adversely affected because of pent-up demand and a tendency
among homebuyers to ignore the possibility of deflation. Non-guarantees do
not release the developer from the obligation to use facility funds if available.
With or without a guarantee, the objective is to structure the facility to fund
its own obligations. It is incumbent upon developers to structure financing to
avoid lack of funds, even if they judge the possibility of deflation and slow
resale to be minimal. The risk that deflation or slow resale will actually
make available funds insufficient to repay residents depends on the rate of
resale, type of financing used, whether a trust or reserve big enough to cover
losses exists, and whether the trust's liquidity is adequate to permit payout or
not. No reserve or trust amount would be adequate to cover all
contingencies, such as a large exodus of residents who need refunds
simultaneously when units cannot be sold immediately. (Even guarantees by
developers are unlikely to be sufficient with such extraordinary
circumstances; few developers could sustain commitments of tens of millions
of dollars.) Sections on specific financing techniques will discuss the
liquidity problem. First, an attempt to quantify potential liability resulting
from deflation or slow resale is presented below.
The table below shows the present value, discounted at 10%, of resale current
income at a range of refund percentages and inflation rates, with and without
guarantee of repayment by the developer. Standard levels of turnover (see
Turnover section above) are assumed. Failure to resell units is not analyzed
specifically, but in effect deflation simulates this to some extent. When there
is no disinflation, current income is the same with and without the guarantee.
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TABLE 5-6: EFFECT OF INFLATION AND REFUND RATE
ON RESALE CURRENT INCOME NPV* (000's)
WITH REFUND GUARANTEE
WITHOUT REFUND GUARANTEE
Refund Price Inflation
Rate -4.0% -2.0% 0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0%
80.0% (296) 895 2,321 2,654 3,035 3,472
291 895 2,321 2,654 3,035 3,472
85.0% (870) 316 1,741 1,990 2,276 2,604
123 416 1,741 1,990 2,276 2,604
90.0% (1,444) (262) 1,161 1,327 1,518 1,736
36 133 1,161 1,327 1,518 1,736
95.0% (2,018) (841) 580 663 759 868
4 17 580 663 759 868
100.0% (2,592) (1,420) 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
* Discount rate 10%.
The loss with deflation must be absorbed by the CCRC (or by the developer if
there is a recourse guarantee) if refunds are to be honored. Using an 8%
discount rate to match interest on a reserve, this suggests that a reserve fund
of roughly $1.75 million could be established to fund a worst-case deflation
of 4% at a 90% refund rate provided all units are resold. (Funds for other
contingencies would be additional.) In the same scenario without resales of
vacated units, the liability could balloon. Nor do these figures take into
account potential volatile turnover, which could increase losses on refunds.
Estimating the liability for refunds more precisely should ideally be done on
an actuarial basis, or at least based on empirical data from a large sample of
projects. It should estimate turnover volatility in conjunction with
inflationary and deflationary expectations. Legislation pending in
Massachusetts would require a reserve several times the assumed $1 million
level. Data on the effect of inflation and deflation on turnover behavior, if
any, would help in estimating refund liability.
TABLE 5-6 suggests, however, that liability and returns are relatively more
sensitive to refund amounts than inflation, given identical turnover rates.
Should developers decide to offer refunds, as all probably will, this analysis
suggests that decreasing the refund amount to 80% than doubles the present
value of resale current income, while increasing inflation from 0% to 6% per
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year only raises the present value by about half. More flexibility in setting or
varying the refund rate, rather than accepting the emerging industry norm
of 90%, would reduce exposure to deflation. The traditional method with
non-profit CCRC's was to amortize the entrance fee over a period of years
until no refund was due. This significantly lowered the liability and allowed
lower fees. With a lower refund rate, liability for refunds would be
considerably more manageable out of facility funds, in combination with the
income only from a modest reserve.
The above discussion examines the downside risk of refund policy if
deflation or slow resales develop. Potentially, with price inflation, a windfall
will accrue in excess proceeds. The present value of excess proceeds at a
90% refund rate ranges from approximately $1.2 to $5.6 million with price
inflation of 2% to 8% respectively (without inflation, there are no excess
proceeds). Slightly less than a third of this return is from interest earned on
the proceeds (assuming they are returned to a reserve). While this appears to
be an obvious source for funding liability, it is dependent on appreciation and
therefore risky. A minimally adequate reserve should be funded with a more
assured source, probably at startup. The excess proceeds might be assigned
to two uses or a combination of the two:
* As income to the developer, in part to give a return on increased initial
reserve funding
* As a supplement to the reserve to help maintain its inflation-adjusted value
With a lower refund rate, a proportion of excess proceeds converts to
current income and may no longer be a major factor.
Determining the refund policy depends, aside from actuarial input, on
marketability factors and expectations of inflationary behavior. The CCRC
developer must weigh the benefits of reduced liability against the cost of a
probable decline in marketability accompanying a lower refund. When
deflation is considered a real risk, such marketability costs may be
worthwhile. The dangers of deflation or soft resale also indicate the
necessity to price the project carefully at the outset. A heavy marketing
6I
effort at startup might sustain above-market nrice.t Rut if nrices decline
over the long-term, so will profitability.
4. NURSING REVENUE AND LIABILITY
If resale operations offer a likely chance for profit and some risk for
liability, nursing operations offer a likely chance for profit and certain
liability. The profit a nursing center the size of Ashford can yield is unlikely
to cover the cost of the subsidy needed to provide guaranteed nursing care. If
nursing care is guaranteed, then developers can expect increasing utilization
and expenses until stabilization, with the potential for volatility before and
after stabilization. To be able to meet the cost, the developer can either
prepay with insurance or a reserve, or set project cash flow to be sufficient to
pay nursing subsidies as they arise.
The Ashford nursing center is a 60-bed facility with projected annual
potential revenues (taking account of Medicaid beds) of $1,551,000. It has its
own mortgage. After vacancy, expenses and debt service, projected cash
flow is $66,865 with a breakeven ratio of 91%. The 5% vacancy is somewhat
deliberate; some beds must be maintained for temporary use by residents.
Stabilized return on equity is 27%. TABLE 5-7 show the nursing center's
12-year proforma.
The nursing subsidy is calculated on the nursing center proforma but
expensed to residential operations because funds for the subsidy come from
revenues generated by residential operations. The subsidy is in effect debited
internally from residential operations to the nursing center revenues. The
estimated amount of the subsidy at Ashford has not been determined by the
developers; it is subject to considerable uncertainty, and they have
commissioned a study to estimate nursing utilization. Estimates on this
proforma are based on temporary usage of nine beds and permanent usage of
from five to 40 beds over 12 years. In terms of expenditure, the estimates
range from $297,327 to $757,974 without inflation.
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TABLE 5-7: PROJECTED NURSING CENTER BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW-NURSING CENTER
YEAR: 'FLATION
GROSS POT REVEN 0.0%
VACANCY
LESS VACANCY
EFFECTIVE GROSS REVENUE
2
1,551,000
25.0%
(387,750)
1,163,250
1,55 1,000
5.0%
(77,550)
1,473,450
1,551,000
5.0%
(77,550)
1,473,450
1,551,00
5.0
(77,55
1,473,45
4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1,551,000 1,551,000 1,551,000 1,551,000 1,551,000
% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
0) (77,550) (77,550) (77,550) (77,550) (77,550)
0 1,473,450 1,473,450 1,473,450 1,473,450 1,473,450
10 11 12
0AA I 1cl IV 15 5 I00n
I'1,100
5.0%
(77,550)
1,4 i,43 1,41.3 4JU 111 A&^
5.0%
(77,550)
5.0%
(77,550)
5 EXPENSES: 0.0% (978,350) (1,151,000) (1,151,000) (1,151,000) (1,151,000) (1,151,000) (1,151,000) (1,151,000) (1,151,000) (1,151,000) (1,151,000) (1,151,000)
6 NET OPERATING INCOME 184,900 322,450 322,450 322,450 322,450 322,450 322,450 322,450 322,450 322,450 322,450 322,450
7 DEBT SERVICE (255,585) (255,585) (255,585) (255,585) (255,585) (255,585) (255,585) (255,585) (255,585) (255,585) (255,585) (255,585)
(70,684) 66,865
9 SUBSIDY % TEMP 0.00 15.0% 15.0%
10 SUBSIDY % PERM 2.70 4.2% 6.9%
11 TOTAL % SUBSIDY 19.2% 21.9%
12 SUBSIDY (297,327) (339,204)
NOTES:
1 Includes subsidy. Actual cash potential revenue is less subsidy
5 Exvenses Year 1 based on 85% load
66,865 66,865 66,865 66,865 66,865 66,865 66,865 66,865 66,865 66,865
15.0%
9.6%
24.6%
(381 081)
15.0%
12.3%
21.3%
(422958)
15.0%
15.0%
30.0%
(464,835)
15.0%
17.7%
32.7%
(506,712)
15.0%
20.4%
3-.4%
(548,589)
15.0%
23.1%
i&1% 4i.YYo 4(3.2%
(590,466)
15.0%
25.8%
40.8%4
(632,343)
15.0%
28.5%
43.320
(674,220)
15.0%
31.2%
40.97
(716,097) (71
15.0%
33.9%
57.974)
9 Represents percent of potential revenues lost because residents occupy nursing beds temporarily. A temporary resident requires a 100% subsidy per bed.
Percent is based on assumption of nine beds (15%) used by residents initially. This figure based on Lavanthol & Horwath survey data and projections of a Boston area CCRC.
Growth rate is in percentage points.
10 Represents percent of potential revenues lost because residents occupy nursing beds permanently. A permanent resident is assumed to require a 50% subsidy per bed.
Percent is based on assumption of five beds (4.2% after 50% discount) used by residents initially. This figure based on Lavanthol & Horwath survey data and projections of a Boston area CCRC.
12 From Line 11(Total % Subsidy) * Line 1 (Gross Potential Revenues)
1
2
3
4
8 BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
I I
,38 0,1
1,473 ,450 U 1,47.3,450 1,473,45
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When the subsidy is treated as "self-insurance" in this manner---ie, paid for
from project revenues---it markedly affects cash flow. (See TABLE 5-3)
The subsidy causes real residential operations cash flow to deteriorate over
the maturation period, although after the 12 years, if not sooner, the subsidy
and cash flow is likely to stabilize. Inflation may mask the increasing
liability, but examining the cost in real terms with no inflation shows that the
early years of the residential operations are more profitable not counting
resale income. From the first stabilized year to Year 12, residential
operations cash flow with resident financing deteriorates 54%. The decline
is due entirely to the nursing subsidy. Inflation mitigates the decline (5%
income and expense inflation reduces the cash flow drop to 35%).
There is a way to lesson the risk of increasing and potentially volatile
liability, aside from limiting nursing care. The alternative to self-insurance
would be long-term care insurance. If obtained at the rate of an upfront
payment by the developer of $5,000 per unit and ongoing payments of $100
per month per unit, it is more costly than self insurance at the calculated rate:
TABLE 5-8: COSTS OF SELF VS LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE
(12 YEARS)
Self- Long-term Care
Insurance Insurance
Upfront Cost $0 $1,500,000
PV Costs Years
1-12@10%* $3,278,066 $2.698.222
Total $3,278,066 $4,198,222
*Present value figured for construction year
At the moment, the developers of Ashford have not found insurance rates this
low, which is the rate they anticipated. Furthermore the insurance has a
deductible that the facility would have to pay for. It would cost at least
$900,000 more than self insurance at the projected utilization, although it
becomes incrementally cheaper over the longer term if annual premiums
continue to cost less than the annual subsidy.
Whether this is a justified expense in the short term (12 years) is indicated by
analyzing the present value of different rates of permanent-patient nursing
utilization. At the same rate of year-to-year increase in utilization , a worst-
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case scenario of 30% more permanent utilization still costs less than the
insurance premium. Cash flow of residential operations in Year 12 can still
absorb the subsidy. However, if the utilization rate begins higher or rises
faster; if nursing expense inflation outpaces revenue inflation, as it has in the
past; or if the facility runs into other problems that drain cash flow; then the
insurance premium is considerably cheaper than worst-case scenarios. Since
both the subsidy amounts and the insurance costs are uncertain at this point,
recommendations on how to pay for the subsidy will have to depend on better
data, preferably data with an actuarial basis.
If the opportunity to price some nursing care on a fee-for-service basis
existed for Ashford, the savings would be considerable. If developers
guaranteed nursing care to the relatively stable temporary patients only, the
savings could be passed on to residents and lesson the chances that the
community would default on this obligation. The present value of the
permanent usage alone is $1,696,066. This is a trend among "second-wave"
and "third-wave" CCRC's. Yet the all-inclusive continuing care program is a
highly marketable product because it gives seniors the most freedom from
worry about their own financial status. Proper analysis of the liability should
allow a solvent structure to be applied. While guaranteeing nursing care
incurs risk, the risk appears manageable in well-capitalized projects.
Within a project, one alternative to funding all of the subsidy out of
residential operating revenues is to assign all resale revenues to help defray
the subsidy or build a reserve whose income funds the subsidy. These two
income streams are well matched in some ways: resale income should
increase as the subsidy does. Revenues from resales are a potential source of
funding for the nursing liability with price appreciation; without it, the
revenues are not sufficient. With an appreciation rate equal to or greater
than the nursing inflation rate, the revenues eventually rise high enough to
cover the nursing subsidy. The respective rates determine when the revenues
are sufficient. Counting on such appreciation is a risky way to the nursing
liability.
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The relative importance of a particular profit center in a CCRC varies with
financing, pricing, size of the component, and "policy" decisions on the part
of the developer. For Ashford, consolidated statements of all the profit
centers with various financing alternatives are presented in Chapter 6. In
general, however, the various profit centers have some risk attributes across
different financing schemes:
TABLE 5-9: MAJOR PROFIT CENTER RISKS
Profit Center Ma jor Risks
Startup Revenues Pricing at too low a margin
Slow absorption
High construction costs
Depletion by reserve funding
Residential Operations
Resale Activity
Nursing Operations
Slow occupancy
Excess expense inflation over income inflation
Inability to pass through price increases
(Nursing--see below)
Depreciation of unit prices
Slow resale of vacated units
High turnover in combination with above
High nursing utilization
Maintaining empty beds for resident use
Excess expense inflation over income inflation
The role of financing is to mitigate these risks and, of course, maximize
returns. Chapter 6 discusses financing mechanisms with these considerations
in mind.
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Financing "Ashford":
Debt or No Debt
This chapter focuses on long-term financing of Ashford. It discusses the
returns, risks and advantages of the two fee structure and financing
combinations under consideration for Ashford, both of which require
upfront fees. The developers of Ashford are seriously considering schemes:
- Residentfinancing, using the unit sales revenue as a permanent take out of
the construction loan.
* Permanent mortgage financing with a trust, where some or all of the sales
revenue is invested in a trust whose income funds the debt service
This chapter will discuss these as well as a third plan not under consideration:
* An all-rentalfee structure, with no upfront fees, also using mortgage
financing
The analysis shows that for the proprietary developer, in a project with
Ashford's characteristics, resident financing is likely to offer the greatest and
least risky financial returns. Mortgage financing with a trust carries
arbitrage problems which the financing structure must overcome as well as
various other drawbacks. Mortgage financing with an all-rental fee structure
can potentially produce very large returns for the developer, but the risk that
they will not materialize is considerable.
Ashford is an upscale CCRC. Its price levels with the two upfront fee
alternatives result in a large initial "building profit"---the retail price in
excess of cost---most of which may be returned to the developer immediately
depending on the fee structure. This is a distinguishing characteristic of
proprietary CCRC's over the most non-profit projects, which usually price
67
upfront fees at or below building cost. 1 Obviously this startup profit
enriches the developer. Can other financing methods offer alternative
sources of profit that return as much? How does the return of building profit
to the developer affect the solvency of the project?
1. RESIDENT FINANCING
The distinguishing feature of using upfront payments as a permanent take-
out, as noted, is that a large profit is made immediately. The size of this
profit depends on the size of the reserve established, but it is large enough in
Ashford's case to allow both a significant startup return and a large reserve.
While the sections above have presented parts of the resident financing
alternative, TABLE 6-1 is a consolidated statement giving summary data.
The consolidated statement shows that almost two thirds of the return in
present value terms comes from the startup profit. Nursing center return is
rendered almost insignificant (3.3%) and resale income is minor (12.8%). A
nearly 200% total return on equity in present value terms (profitability
index) illustrates the profitability of the project over twelve years (plus two
years startup and initial construction). Even considering the risk incurred,
the returns of this scheme appear excellent.
Reserves. The handling of the startup profit offers a number of different
opportunities for dealing with the special risks and liabilities of a CCRC.
These calculations assume a $1 million general reserve, which can be used
for nursing subsidies, refunds, and other expenditures if other revenue
sources are insufficient. As the sections on nursing subsidies and resales in
Chapter 5 suggest, this amount may be too little to cover the multi-million
dollar liabilities. Furthermore, non-profit CCRC's which do make building
profits usually return most of them to the reserve. Their competition may
require a bigger reserve. TABLE 6-2 (page 70) shows the effect of
increasing the reserve.
lLaventhol and Horwath, p. 16, cites median entrance fees of $38,000-$96,000 for studio
to three-bedroom units in post-1977 projects. Nearly all of sample is non-profits.
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TABLE 6-1: RESIDENT FINANCING---CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT (in 000's)
ACT[VITY: START UP C(
YEAR:
RESIDENTIAL OPERATIONS:
1 TOTAL REVENUES
2 TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES
3 NET OPERATING INCOME
4 TOTAL DEBT SERVICE/PARTICIPATION
5 BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW 0
NPV 1,850
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
UNIT RESALES:
TURNOVER VALUE
RESALE INCOME
1
1 0
NPV 1,161
NURSING CENTER:
TOTAL EFFECTIVE REVENUES
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES
NET OPERATING INCOME
DEBT SERVICE
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW 0
NPV 301
TOTAL:
START UP
RESIDENTIAL OPER
UNIT RESALES
NURSING HOME
TOTAL CASH FLOW
(4,050)
(4,050)
ONSTST/JPER OPER
1 2
1,323
(2.082)
3,418
(3,313)
OPER OPER OPER
3 4 5
4,270
(3,602)
4,270
(3,642)
4,270
(3,681)
OPER OPER
6 7
4,270
(3,721)
4,270
(3,761)
OPER OPER.
8 9
4,270
(3,801)
4,270
(3,840)
OPER OPER OPER
10 11 12
4,270
(3,880)
4,270
(3,920)
4,270
(3,960)
,
(759) 105 668 628 588 548 509 469 429 389 349 310
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 (759) 105 668 628 588 548 509 469 429 389 349 310
0 458 917 1,375 1,833 2,291 2,750 3,208 3,666 3,666 3,666 3,666
0 0 46 92 137 183 229 275 321 367 367 367 367
1,163 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473
(978) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151)
185 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322
(256) (256) (256) (256) (256) (256) (256) (256) (256) (256) (256) (256)
0 (71) 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
0 0
(759)
0
(71)
0 (830)
13,096
105
46
67
13,314
668
92
67
826
628
137
67
832
588
183
67
548
229
67
509
275
67
469
321
67
429
367
67
844
389
367
67
349
367
67
823
310
367
67
/43
NPV'oTOTAL
START UP 5,789 63.6%
RESIDENTIAL OPER 1,850 20.3%
UNIT RESALES 1,161 12.8%
NURSING CENTER 301 3.3%
TOTAL 9,101 100.0%
PROFITABIL.IND 192.2%
IRR 50.0%
EQUITY REQUIRED (4,880)
CASH ON CASH overall a 40.2%
stabilize 16.9%
272.9% 16.9% 17.1% 17.2% 17.3% 17.4% 17.6% 17.7% 16.9% 16.0% 15.2%
NOTES:
All NPV's @ discount 10.0%
All NPV's figured for start up year---two years before Year 1
2 Includes replacement reserve
ON
385 50 856 862 /83
TABLE 6-2: RESIDENT FINANCING---EFFECT OF INCREASING
THE RESERVE ON REVENUES* (000's)
Reserve Startup Total
Amount NPV % Total NPV % Change
1,000 5,789 63.6% 9,101 0%
2,000 5,038 57.8% 8,719 -4.2%
3,000 4,287 51.4% 8,337 -8.4%
4,000 3,535 44.4% 7,955 -12.6%
5,000 2,784 36.8% 7,573 -16.8%
6,000 2,033 28.3% 7,191 -21.0%
7,000 1,282 18.8% 6,809 -25.2%
8,000 530 8.3% 6,420 -29.4%
9,000 (221) -3.7% 6,047 -33.6%
10,000 (972) -17.2% 5,663 -37.8%
*NPV's discounted at 10%
A reserve of over $8 million is possible before the startup profit is used on a
present value basis. The developer can mitigate future risk by foregoing
initial profit. The figure actually chosen should depend on actuarial analysis.
Increasing the reserve itself raises financial structuring issues, because larger
reserves increase interest income as long as the principal is not spent. Three
alternatives for treating interest are:
1. If interest on the reserve accrues back to the developer through residential
operations, and the reserve is not spent, the reserve functions as an annuity
for the developer (albeit one subject to depletion of the reserve principal).
This is why total NPV in TABLE 6-2 does not decline commensurately with
the reserve increase. (One strategy to financially justify increasing the
reserve is to give it a preferred return out of cash flow above prevailing
interest rates.)
2. If the developer forsakes the interest income and it accrues back to the
reserve, the reserve should grow as nursing and resale liabilities increase to
further reduce risk. This strategy also makes a a smaller initial reserve
feasible.
3. It is possible use a large reserve to subsidize residential operations through
lowering monthly fees with interest income. Again, where competition with
non-profits affects pricing considerations, this should improve
marketability.
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TABLE 6-3: RESIDENT FINANCING---
EQUITY REQUIREMENTS (in 000's)
TOTAL SALES
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COSTS
GROSS BUILDING PROFIT
LESS RESERVE
NET BUILDING PROFIT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
45,825
(38,015)
7,810
(1,000)
6,810
TART UP
(375)
(1,600)
(1,700)
(375)
17.0%
CONST
CONST OPER
1
(375)
(16,420)
(375)
(16,420)
OPER
2
(375)
(4,050) (16,795) (16,795) (375)
(1,000)
22,913 22,913
(4,050) (16,795) 6,117 21,538
14 CONST FINANCING RECIEVED,
CONST FINANCING PAID:
15 WITH SURPLUS
16 WITH PERMANENT FINANCING
20
21
22
23
DEVELOPMENT CASH FLOW
OPERATIONS CASH FLOW
EQUITY REQUIRED
CUMMULATIVE
0 16,795
(6,117)
(2,237)
(4,050)
(4,050)
(4,050)
0 0
(830)
0 (830)
(4,050) (4,880)
CONST FINANCING OUTSTANDING
PERMANENT FINANCING RECEIVED
PERMANENT FINANCING OUTSTANDING
NOTES:
Does not include operating deficit
Total development costs less all costs in lines 6-9
Assumes full coverage
From TABLE 9
(16,795) (8,441)
2,237
(2,237)
ACTIVITY: S
YEAR:
START UP FUND
LAND
PRECONSTRUCTION COSTS
MARKETING
REMAINING DEVELOPMENT COSTS
RESERVE
SALES
SURPLUS (DEFICIT)
(8,441)
13,096
218
13,314
8,435
2
10
14
21
0
(2,237)
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Whichever strategy is used, it is apparent that the ability to establish a large
reserve and the benefits of reserve income are strong advantages of resident
financing.
Equity Requirements. Preconstruction expenses total $4,050,000 in all
the financing schemes. This, combined with losses in the first year of
operation, results in total project equity of $4,880,000. TABLE 6-3 shows
cash flow during the initial four years, and how equity is quickly returned
through startup profits.
The developers of Ashford plan to finance some of the preconstruction costs.
While normally construction financing would require 50% presales to start,
the developers expect to receive more lenient treatment. This financing will
further the enhance the returns, but it should do so equally in all financing
alternatives.
Syndication of the startup equity would also enhance the developers' returns.
Its effect on returns would depend on how investors' return of equity is
timed. If paid out of operations cash flow or resale income and not startup
profit, syndication would relatively improve the standing of the resident
financed alternative to the others. Any reduction of the startup profit erodes
the primary advantage of resident financing.
Inflation. The large startup profit of resident financing makes project
overall return less sensitive to inflation than other financing. Furthermore,
there is no opportunity to benefit from an increasing spread between
partially fixed expenses which exists with fixed debt service, and inflation-
driven income. The effect of inflation on the net present value of the
consolidated returns, when income and expense inflation are the same, is as
follows:
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TABLE 6-4: RESIDENT FINANCING---EFFECT OF INFLATION
ON TOTAL REVENUE (PRICE INFLATION 0%)
Income and
Expense Total
Expense NPV* % Change
0% $9,101,000 0.0%
2% $9,637,000 5.9%
4% $10,246,000 12.5%
6% $10,936,000 20.2%
8% $11,719,000 28.8%
*Discounted at 10%
The relatively small effect on total return when income and expense inflation
increase concomitantly should not obscure the threat to cash flow if negative
inflation spreads emerge. A spread of just one percent of more expense
inflation than income inflation results in negative residential operations NOI
by Year 11 or 12 depending on the respective inflation rates. By Year 12,
NOI is less than a tenth of revenues; there is little tolerance for the downside
risk of inflation unless prefunding of the nursing liability is made.
In sum, the resident financing alternative offers considerable startup profits,
ample reserve funding and possibly advantageous use of syndication. These
are benefits to the developer. What price is paid? For the developer, the
project does not respond to the upside potential of inflation. For residents,
only the underlying real estate provides financial security beyond the
reserve. Because permanent debt does not encumber the property, there is
no threat of foreclosure. The community could fail and have to dissolve,
however, after unanticipated occupancy and resale problems, nursing
liability, or inflation spreads. Then the somewhat illiquid and specialized
physical plant is the only security to pay off refunds. Mortgage financing is
one method to address this problem.
2. MORTGAGE FINANCING WITH A TRUST
The traditional way to finance CCRC's, before developers began to use
upfront fees as permanent take-outs, has been to invest the sale proceeds in an
investment trust which funds debt service on a tax-exempt bond. If the
financing is secured by the real estate, the trust constitutes a source of refunds
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in case of project failure. Furthermore, where financing permits positive
arbitrage, the trust is leveraged to increase revenues for the facility. The
benefits of mortgage financing diminish considerably when positive
arbitrage is not available. Does it still make sense? Compared to resident,
financing, the answer is a qualified no.
Mortgage financing with an upfront fee structure involves five key issues:
1. Arbitrage ---the rate differential between investment interest and
mortgage interest---can make or break mortgage financing.
2. Amortization on the mortgage, if any, can intensify the effect of negative
arbitrage by effectively increasing the loan's nominal interest rate.
3. Initialfunding, such as a short-term reserve and return of equity, can
diminish funds available for the trust and thus debt ratio.
4. The term of the mortgage raises issues of refinancing security.
5. Liquidity of the trust, if it is invested in long-term instruments to yield
high rates, may be incompatible with cash needs in worst case scenarios.
Arbitrage and Amortization. Positive arbitrage is often possible with
tax-exempt financing, and it allows non-profits to finance 100% of costs,
including the high fees involved, with entrance prices that may total less than
the mortgage issue. Tax-exempt financing is not an workable option at
Ashford, nor at many other proprietary, upfront-fee projects for reasons
such as inclusionary unit requirements, high fees, and possibly unfavorable
tax treatment of positive arbitrage. At best, Ashford can realize neutral or
negative arbitrage; the latter is more likely.
TABLE 6-5 shows maximum debt with various arbitrage spreads between
interest income and nominal mortgage interest. Debt in each of the cases is
set by the maximum amount the trust could fund after paying for reserves,
development deficits and interest on the developer's equity (explained in the
Equity Return and Reserve Funding section below). This assumes 100% sell
out, and and use of 100% of the interest income for debt service. Obviously,
prudent debt levels would be even lower to account for shortfalls in initial
sales and variability in interest income.
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EFFECT OF ARBITRAGE ON MAXIMUM DEBT AMOUNT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
INCOME MORTGAGE TOTAL DEVELOPMENT NET SALES TRUST INCOME LTV
INTEREST INTEREST SPREAD SALES COST TO TRUST & DEBT SER DEBT RATIO
8.0% 8.0% 0.0% 45,825,000 39,866,653 64,027,029 5,122,162 58,172,181 126.9%
8.0% 8.5% -0.5% 45,825,000 39,339,570 47,993,202 3,839,456 41,611,272 90.8%
8.0% 9.0% -1.0% 45,825,000 39,042,462 38,955,226 3,116,418 32,276,188 70.4%
8.0% 9.5% -1.5% 45,825,000 38,851,991 33,161,130 2,652,890 26,291,621 57.4%
8.0% 10.0% -2.0% 45,825,000 38,719,628 29,134,665 2,330,773 22,132,793 48.3%
8.0% 10.5% -2.5% 45,825,000 38,622,403 26,177,103 2,094,168 19,078,007 41.6%
8.0% 11.0% -3.0% 45,825,000 38,548,038 23,914,914 1,913,193 16,741,451 36.5%
ASSUMPTIONS: RESERVE 1,000,000
EQUITY INTEREST PAYMENT 1,340,000
ORIGINATION FEES 3.0%
NURSING CENTER MORTGAGE 2,236,500
2 Face rate, not constant
5 Does not include reserve or interest on equity
6 Remainder of sales spent on development cost deficit, reserve, and interest on equity
7 100% of trust income goes to debt service
9 Ratio of debt amount to total sales. Does not include nursing center debt.
TABLE 6-5:
Negative arbitrage more than one percentage point results in very low loan-
to-value ratios. With a spread of zero points, a maximum theoretical
mortgage could far exceed the development cost, and augment the trust to a
level above the sales price. With positive arbitrage, there is virtually no limit
to maximum theoretical debt, although underwriting and regulatory
standards,of course, would limit debt. With non-amortizing loans, the debt
amount can be considerably higher: about 40% higher with neutral
arbitrage, and 23% higher with 2% negative arbitrage. Different interest
rates also have an effect. If the spread is based on an interest income rate of
less than 8%, the spread is proportionately more significant and the loan-to-
value ratio declines. A higher income interest rate, conversely, improves the
ratio.
The actual spread that can be expected at Ashford will depend on debt
sources, and the trust and debt source are likely to be tied together. Two
cases are examined: an ideal spread of zero points, with debt of $36,660,000
(80% loan-to-value ratio); and a spread of two points, with debt of
$22,132,793. The debt depends on full sell out. (More detailed parts of the
proformas are APPENDIX TABLES 4-9.) Consolidated statements are in
TABLES 6-6 and 6-7. (In both cases construction financing costs are
assumed to be equal with the resident financed alternative, because the
permanent loan could be phased in, or the sales revenue could take out the
construction loan until replenished by the permanent mortgage.)
Neither alternative requires a net equity investment after sell-out. On the
whole, however, returns are close to the non-startup returns of the resident-
financed alternative, although returns from residential operations are
marginally higher than with resident financing because interest is earned
during Year 2. In addition, the return with neutral interest-rate arbitrage is
greater because the trust earns excess income over debt service. In the
proforma this accrues to the developer, but as with resident financing there
are many ways to treat this investment income (see Section 1---Reserves).
These trust/mortgage financing alternatives benefit slightly more from
inflation than resident financing, because inflation-insensitive startup profits
are not a part of the returns. With 8% income and expense inflation, for
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TABLE 6-6: TRUST/MORTGAGE FINANCING WITH 0% ARBITRAGE---CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT (in 000's)
ACTIVITY: START UP CONSTST/OPE
YEAR:
RESIDENTIAL OPERATIONS:
TOTAL REVENUES
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES
NET OPERATING INCOME
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE/PARTICIPATION
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW 0
NPV 3,296
UNIT RESALES:
6 TURNOVER VALUE
7 RESALE INCOME
1
1 0
NPV 1,161
NURSING CENTER:
TOTAL EFFECTIVE REVENUES
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES
NET OPERATING INCOME
DEBT SERVICE
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
NPV
TOTAL:
START UP (
RESIDENTIAL OPER
UNIT RESALES
NURSING HOME
TOTAL CASH FLOW (
1,323
(2,082)
(759)
0
R OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3,941
(3,313)
628
0
7,725
(3,602)
4,124
(3,228)
7,725
(3,642)
4,084
(3,228)
7,725
(3,681)
4,044
(3,228)
7,725 7,725
(3,721) (3,761)
4,004 3,965
(3,228) (3,228)
7,725
(3,801)
3,925
(3,228)
7,725
(3,840)
3,885
(3,228)
OPER OPER
10 11
7,725
(3,880)
3,845
(3,228)
7,725
(3,920)
3,805
(3,228)
0 (759) 628 896 856 816 776 737 697 657 617 577 538
0 458 917 1,375 1,833 2,291 2,750 3,208 3,666 3,666 3,666 3,666
0 0 46 92 137 183 229 275 321 367 367 367 36
1,163 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473
(978) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151)
185
(256)
0 0 (71)
301
4,050)
4,050)
0 0
(759)
0
(71)
0 (830)
322
(256)
67
5,390
628
46
67
6,131
322
(256)
67
896
92
67
1,054
322
(256)
67
322
(256)
67
856 816
137 183
67 67
1,060 1,066
322
(256)
67
776
229
67
1,072
322
(256)
67
737
275
67
1,078
322 322
(256) (256)
67 67
697
321
67
1,084
657
367
67
1,090
322
(256)
67
617
367
67
1,051
322
(256)
67
577
367
67
1,011
START UP
RESIDENTIAL OPER
UNIT RESALES
NURSING HOME
TOTAL
PROFITABIL.IND
IRR
EQUITY REQUIRED
CASH ON CASH
NPV6 TOTAL
0 0.0%
3,296 69.3%
1,161 24.4%
301 6.3%
4,756 100.0%
100.4%
27.5%
(4,880)
overall a-
stabilize<
NOTES:
All NPV's @ discount 10.0%
31.1%
21.6%
125.6% 21.6% 21.7% 21.9% 22.0% 22.1% 22.2% 22.3% 21.5% 20.7% 19.9%
All NPV's figured for start up year---two years before Year 1
2 Includes replacement reserve
1
2
3
4
5
OPER
12
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
7,725
(3,960)
3,766
(3,228)
322
(256)
67
538
367
67
971
TABLE 6-7: TRUST/MORTGAGE FINANCING WITH 2% ARBITRAGE---CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT (in 000's)
ACTIVITY: START UP
YEAR:
RESIDENTIAL OPERATIONS:
1 TOTAL REVENUES
2 TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES
3 NET OPERATING INCOME
4 TOTAL DEBT SERVICE/PARTICIPATION
5 BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW 0
NPV 2,271
UNIT RESALES:
6 TURNOVER VALUE
7 RESALE INCOME
1
1
NPV
NURSING CENTER:
8 TOTAL EFFECTIVE REVENUES
9 TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES
10 NET OPERATING INCOME
11 DEBT SERVICE
12 BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
TOTAL:
13 START UP
14 RESIDENTIAL OPER
15 UNIT RESALES
16 NURSING HOME
17 TOTAL CASH FLOW
START UP
RESIDENTIAL OPER
UNIT RESALES
NURSING HOME
TOTAL
PROFITABIL.IND
IRR
EQUITY REQUIRED
CASH ON CASH
N @S:
All NPV's @ discount
0
1,161
NPV 301
(4,050)
(4,050)
NPV'o TOTAL
0 0.0%
2,271 60.9%
1,161 31.1%
301 8.1%
3,732 100.0%
78.8%
25.0%
(4,880)
overall av 26.9%
stabilized 16.9%
10.0%
CONSTST/OPER OPER,
1 2
OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1,323 3,978 6,600 6,600
(2,082) (3,313) (3,602) (3,642)
6,600 6,600 6,600 6,600
(3,681) (3,721) (3,761) (3,801)
6,600
(3,840)
6,600
(3,880)
OPER OPER
11 12
6,600
(3,920)
6,600
(3,960)
(759) 665 2,998 2,959 2,919 2,879 2,839 2,800 2,760 2,720 2,680 2,640
0 0 (2,331) (2,331) (2,331) (2,331) (2,331) (2,331) (2,331) (2,331) (2,331) (2,331)
0 (759) 665 668 628 588 548 509 469 429 389 349 310
0 458 917 1,375 1,833 2,291 2,750 3,208 3,666 3,666 3,666 3,666
0 0 46 92 137 183 229 275 321 367 367 367 36
1,163 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473
(978) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151)
185(256)
0 0 (71)
0 0
(759)
0
(71)
0 (830)
322(256)
67
5,390
665
46
67
6,168
322
(256)
67
668
92
67
322
(256)
67
628
137
67
322
(256)
67
588
183
67
322
(256)
67
548
229
67
322
(256)
67
509
275
67
322
(256)
67
469
321
67
322
(256)
67
429
367
67
322
(256)
67
389
367
67
322
(256)
67
349
367
67
322
(256)
67
310
367
67
826 832 838 844 850 856 862 823 783 743
126.4% 16.9% 17.1% 17.2% 17.3% 17.4% 17.6% 17.7% 16.9% 16.0% 15.2%
All NPV's figured for start up year---two years before Year 1
2 Includes replacement reserve
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example, the neutral-arbitrage alternative's total NPV increases 55%, and the
negative-arbitrage scheme's return increases 70%. These compare with 28%
for resident financing. Although fixed debt is involved with these
alternatives, it is funded separately by the trust and does not play a role in
leveraging inflation to increase benefits as it does with the rental scheme.
Equity Return and Refund Funding. With trust/mortgage financing, it
is difficult to fund initial outlays beyond the facility cost. These outlays
include startup profits and reserves. The degree of difficulty depends on
whether the outlay can be funded by the debt as a development cost. With
resident financing, it is easy to fund large reserves and to return equity early
in the project's life. The trust/mortgage financing alternatives assume a
return of the equity as well as interest on it. This results in a startup NPV of
$0. But to yield a startup profit or to fund a reserve larger than $1 million
may reduce the debt amount drastically, reverting the project to primarily
resident financing. With a total of $4 million startup payment (for either
use), the maximum possible debt for three arbitrage spreads decreases as
follows:
TABLE 6-8: EFFECT OF INCREASING THE RESERVE
ON MAXIMUM DEBT
Interest Debt With Debt With
Spread $1m Startup $4m Startup
0.0% $58,172,181 $35,526,195
1.0% $32,276,188 $19,711,318
2.0% $22,132,793 $13,516,668
*Income interest rate 8%
These are the debt amounts that result when the increased upfront costs are
not funded by the debt. They show that to increase initial funding
significantly appears worthwhile with only neutral arbitrage or negligible
positive arbitrage. If these expenses can be included in the debt coverage,
however, funding becomes somewhat easier. For example, for a
$36,660,000 loan with neutral arbitrage, fees or reserves of up to 10.25% of
the debt are possible until trust interest cannot cover debt service. But with
significant negative arbitrage, such amounts of upfront fees quickly become
impossible without drastically reducing debt amounts. Furthermore,
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proprietary developers will find it hard to secure debt that will fund startup
profits per se.
Term. The term of the mortgage is one issue that further differentiates
proprietary developers from non-profits. Whereas non-profits can
frequently obtain long-term bond financing, proprietary developers seeking
conventional loans are confronted with short terms and consequent financing
risk. One bank informally quoted a term of five years to the Ashford
developers, which would compel the developer to refinance or extend the
loan at that time. Banks appear hesitant to commit themselves to long-term
lending on a type of product that is so untested. When the loan matures,
higher rates could threaten the project, since the investments are likely to be
in long-term instruments and not easily reinvested. The term of the loan
should be tied to the investment term of the trust. A refinancing profit is
possible if the trust has been augmented with resale revenues, but the same
level of debt after refinancing is more likely.
Liquidity. A major purpose of the trust is to have cash funds available for
refund in case the project defaults and the lender forecloses. If tied up in
long-term investments, as with refinancing, the trust is somewhat less liquid.
If the yield is competitive with current rates, the investments could be
liquidated relatively fast at a discount off their face value. Since a maximum
of 90% will normally be refundable, and less in inflationary times,
substantial leeway should exist for adequate refunds after selling the
investments at a discount. A greater problem may be that with much positive
arbitrage, the net trust value is lower along with the debt amount. It is
unlikely to cover much of the refund liability if the project defaults, even if
supplemented with other revenues such as resale proceeds. The value
provided to the residents by the trust in a foreclosure may be as little as the
realizable value of the facility in the failure of a resident-financed project. A
key reason for choosing the trust/mortgage financing alternative in the first
place is resident security, and arbitrage nullifies the effect.
In sum, mortgage financing with a trust for resident security appears to be
desirable with neutral (or positive) arbitrage. As a proprietary project,
Ashford is likely to use conventional mortgage financing and thus have
80
negative arbitrage, and even with inflation the returns to the developer are
low. The problems of term and trust liquidity pose some risk. Upfront
funding of reserves (or startup profit) if difficult with negative arbitrage.
Most of all, however, the drawback is the very low loan-to-value ratio, and a
trust of limited value to residents.
3. AN ALL-RENTAL FEE STRUCTURE WITH MORTGAGE
FINANCING
The all-rental fee structure is the norm in congregates but rare in continuing
care centers. The rental structure, as discussed in Chapter 4, offers
advantages such as exemption from some state regulations affecting upfront
fee projects, presumed easier marketability, and no future refund liability.
But its financial drawbacks in a CCRC are enormous, although not
insurmountable. These include:
- Necessarily high rents which make qualifying incomes very high.
- The lack of Federal and a dearth of private credit enhancement to secure
low mortgage rates.
* The difficulty in most cases of pulling equity out of the project in the early
years.
* The difficulty of establishing large reserves for nursing care liability.
In addition to the absence of refund liability, the rental structure also has
three other financial attractions which partly balance these drawbacks:
* With fixed debt, much greater sensitivity to inflation which can result in
huge cash flow increases in the right circumstances.
- Potential profit from future sale of the facility.
- The tax advantage of depreciation that is not conferred on developers of
cooperative projects.
This section will discuss these issues in the context of Ashford.
The amount of debt a proprietary CCRC can secure from conventional
sources is subject to high coverage requirements. Ratios of 1.20 to 1.25 are
81
probably required. For a base case at Ashford, a 10%, 30-year amortizing
mortgage of $36,660,000 (80% of the sales value) has been used for
comparability with one of the trust/mortgage financing loans. Rents have
been increased from the level in the other alternatives to cover the debt
service (with a vacancy factor). The loan is funded after the eighteen months
of construction, and adjustments have been made to such factors as the
replacement reserve and management fee. Debt coverage at stabilization is
1.18. TABLE 6-9 shows consolidated returns. (See APPENDIX TABLES
10-11 for remaining parts of the proforma.)
Rent Levels. At Ashford, the necessary rent levels create real and
perceived affordability problems. The real affordability problem is that
rents for Ashford would have to increase over $1100 (from the rents in the
first two alternatives) to cover the debt service, with allowance for vacancy.
The average rent would would be $2258. The difference, if capitalized at an
approximate investment income rate of 8%, is worth $169,500. This is about
$17,000 more than the average price assumed in the upfront fee alternatives.
Thus in this scenario the rental alternative is more expensive than buying for
prospects. It always will cost more if negative arbitrage is at play between
investment income rates for residents and mortgage rates for developers.
Delivering lower rents would necessitate accepting lower operating cash
flow than with the other alternatives; reducing expenses by changing the
product configuration or service package; or securing lower cost debt.
The perceived affordability problem is that if prospects have yet to invest
their home equity and realize its income potential, they may feel their
purchasing power is inadequate. Even when the rental price is the same or
better than buying, comparability may not be recognized. Monthly fees of
over $2000 rival even more service-intensive housing such as nursing homes.
In Ashford's case residents would need incomes of $45,160, qualifying at
60% of income, to pay the fees. These issues illustrate how rental structures
in CCRC's raise practical affordability problems. Rental structures make
more marketing sense where lower expenses and debt costs are possible, as
with congregates or less luxurious CCRC's.
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TABLE 6-9: ALL-RENTAL STRUCTURE---CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT (in 000's)
ACTIVITY: START UP CONSTST/OP1
YEAR:
RESIDENTIAL OPE RATIONS:
TOTAL REVENUES
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES
NET OPERATING INCOME
TOTAL DEBT SERVICE/PARTICIPATION
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOV 0
NPV 987
UNIT RESALES:
6 TURNOVER VAL
7 RESALE INCOME
1
1
NPV
NURSING CENTER:
TOTAL EFFECTIVE REVENUES
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES
NET OPERATING INCOME
DEBT SERVICE
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOV
NPV 3(
TOTAL:
START UP
RESIDENTIAL OPER
UNIT RESALES
NURSING HOME
TOTAL CASH FLOW
0
0
0 0
01
(4,050)
(4,050)
ER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2,583 6,650 8,134
(1,925) (3,273) (3,605)
8,134
(3,645)
8,134
(3,685)
8,134
(3,724)
8,134
(3,764)
8,134
(3,804)
OPER OPER OPER
9 10 11
8,134
(3,844)
8,134
(3,884)
8,134
(3,923)
659 3,377 4,529 4,489 4,449 4,410 4,370 4,330 4,290 4,250 4,211 4,171
(1,930) (3,861) (3,861) (3,861) (3,861) (3,861) (3,861) (3,861) (3,861) (3,861) (3,861) (3,861)
0 (1,272) (483) 668 629 589549 09 469 430 390 350 310
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1,163 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473
(978) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151) (1,151)
185 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322
(256) (256) (256) (256) (256) (256) (256) (256) (256) (256) (256) (256)
(71) 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
0 2,734
(1,272)
0
(71)
0 1,392
(375)
(483)
0
67
(792)
668
0
67
629
0
67
589
0
67
549
0
67
509
0
67
469
0
67
430
0
67
390
0
67
350
0
67
695 656 616 576 536 497 457 417 377
NPV6 TOTAL
START UP (2,072) 264.2%
RESIDENTIAL 01 987 -125.9%
UNIT RESALES 0 0.0%
NURSING CENT] 301 -38.3%
TOTAL (784) 100.0%
PROFITABIL.INE -27.0%
IRR 4.6%
EQUITY REQUIR (4,050)
CASH ON CASH overall av 10.7%
stabilized 13.7%
NOTES:
All NPV's @ discc 10.0%
All NPV's figured for start up year---two years before Year 1
2 Includes replacement reserve
-19.5% 18.2% 17.2% 16.2% 15.2% 14.2% 13.2% 12.3% 11.3% 10.3% 9.3%
1
2
3
4
5
OPER
12
8,134
(3,963)
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
310
0
67
735
Equity Return and Reserve Funding. Aside from futures, the returns
realizable from a rental structure (See TABLE 6-9) are essentially just the
income streams from residential operations and nursing. These are not high
enough to cover the equity investment over the 12-year period at the rent and
debt assumptions, and a negative present value is the result. Furthermore, it
is likely that loan amounts would be based on cost and not the "value created,"
requiring even more equity and making high reserve funding more difficult.
This suggests that rental structures are appropriate for using outside equity
financing, and for limiting liabilities requiring high reserves. Limiting
nursing care guarantees would allow a smaller reserve, provided a reserve is
not required for debt service by regulation.
TABLE 6-10 shows that to increase returns significantly, without using
equity financing or limiting nursing subsidies, through rents requires at least
a 10% rise:
TABLE 6-10: RENTAL ALTERNATIVE---EFFECT OF
RENT CHANGES (ALL INFLATION 0%; 000's except rent)
Change Gross Pot, DCR Average Total Change
in Rent Income YR1 YR3_ ent NPV* NPV
-20.0% 5,744 0.85 1,859 (7,702) -882.1%
-15.0% 6,103 0.93 1,958 (5,973) -661.6%
-10.0% 6,462 1.01 2,058 (4,243) -441.0%
-5.0% 6,821 1.09 2,158 (2,514) -220.5%
0.0% 7,180 1.17 2,258 (784) 0.0%
5.0% 7,539 1.25 2,357 945 220.5%
10.0% 7,898 1.34 2,457 2,675 441.0%
15.0% 8,257 1.42 2,557 4,404 661.6%
20.0% 8,616 1.50 2,656 6,134 882.1%
*Discounted at 10%
Securing a lower mortgage rate is relatively more ineffective than rent
raises. It is necessary to lower the rate over 10% (one interest rate point) to
realize the same return as raising the rent 5%.
Inflation. With no inflation, the returns from a rental structure compare
unfavorably with the two for-sale structures. But the impact of inflation, if
applied to the entire revenues and expenses, allows dramatic improvement in
returns if the project is leveraged with fixed debt.
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TABLE 6-11: RENTAL ALTERNATIVE---EFFECT OF INFLATION ON
TOTAL REVENUE
Income and Total
Expense Inflation NPV* % Change
0% ($784,000) 0.0%
2% $1,938,000 347.2%
4% $5,011,000 739.2%
6% $8,481,000 1181.7%
8% $12,402,000 1681.2%
*Discounted at 10%
This increase is contingent on raising the entire rent, including the portion
used for debt service. Affordability obstacles (eg, the inability of residents
to absorb full increases), or external measures such as rent control, might
stall such large increases. If not, then the rental structure can equal the
returns of the other alternatives with income and expense inflation of 6%-
8%. However, if the excess proceeds from resales are counted as returns
with the upfront fee alternatives, then inflation has to be higher.
With excess expense inflation over income inflation, the rental alternative
can withstand a greater spread than the other alternatives, provided once
again that the income inflation rate covers all revenues.
Futures and Tax Benefits. The missing component in the returns,. of
course, is residual value after a sale or refinancing. The role that futures will
play in rental CCRC's is uncertain. If the value is based on capitalized
operating income and if the nursing liability increases, then the facility's
value may fall in real terms. Limiting, insuring, or prefunding with reserves
the nursing liability may be necessary to prevent this, although with inflation
it diminishes as a problem. Legal considerations may slightly hinder a sale;
changing the the holder of the nursing center CON may be difficult,
requiring the sale of the legal entity that owns the project. Likewise, state
CCRC regulations may limit transfer of certification. Lenders, concerned
about the management intensity of retirement centers, may have limitations
on management changes. To quantify the potential futures, the following
figures show the present value (for the preconstruction startup year) of a sale
in Year 13. The sales price is based on a 10% capitalization rate of total
project NOI, and increasing nursing subsidies:
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TABLE 6-12: RENTAL ALTERNATIVE---RETURN FROM FUTURES*
0% Inflation 4% Inflation 8% Inflation
Sales Price $44,930,000 $69,120,000 $104,920,000
Debt Repayment $34.177.575 $34.177,575 $34,177,575
Net proceeds $10,752,425 $34,942,425 $70,742,420
PV @ 10% $2,831,450 $9,201,450 $18,620,692
*Sale at Year 13
While inflation makes the returns very large, these are conditional on
increase on all the revenues. Another way to analyze this is to note that the
returns are about two to three times the total returns from resales that the
upfront-fee alternatives yield at the same inflation rates. For this type of
product, it is highly risky for the developer (or financing sources) to depend
on futures. A safer strategy is to count on only a partial refinancing. Tax
treatment may enhance their value relative to other types of developer profit,
if they are taxed as capital gains. Capital gains differentials, however, may
not survive pending tax reform legislation, especially for individuals.
Tax benefits also increase the value of rental income as a whole. Since the
developer still owns the property it is possible to depreciate. With straight
line, 30 year depreciation (which is likely after tax reform), Ashford could
shelter over $1 million each year. This is more than the total cash flow.
Passive losses are unlikely to emerge from the tax reform, but the project
cash flow may be actively sheltered. After-tax cash flow may be worth at
least 30% more to a corporation.
In sum, the rental alternative offers problems with affordability and reserve
funding. Limiting the nursing liability is strongly recommended. With high
inflation in the right circumstances, before-tax operating returns can
approximate those of the upfront-fee alternatives with similar inflation. Tax
benefits may shelter cash flow, and futures can potentially multiply the
returns many times. Under these best-case scenarios, returns may exceed
those of other alternatives. But many uncertainties about the role of futures
in CCRC's, about the probability of inflation and the ability to raise total
rents, make these scenarios a risky basis upon which to base financing. To be
a more assured investment for the developer, rents need to be much more
expensive in capitalized terms than other alternatives, or debt at below-
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market rates. Given the probable difficulty of achieving high rents because
of affordability concerns, the lower-cost debt appears a more plausible
alternative. At any rate, the debt amount assumed here---based on value
created---is likely to be optimistic. A lower debt amount requiring more
equity is more likely, and would only diminish the returns more.
4. FINANCING CONCLUSIONS
The final financing decision for a CCRC, including Ashford's case, must be
made after specific debt sources have quoted rates to the developer. It must
also follow decisions on refunds and nursing care, since these will determine
how large certain reserves need to be. Finally, the decision must depend on
the strategy of the developer regarding timing, including whether the
developer seeks short-term startup profits, near-term operating profits or
long-term futures.
Some of the risks with CCRC's are unique to the housing type
(notwithstanding congregates which come close to CCRC's). Primarily,
these are the risks that future costs for refunds and nursing care will be
unexpectedly high. Discretionary policy decisions will affect these risks, as
will factors beyond the developer's control such as regulation and
affordability of long-term care insurance. Good actuarial projections and
high reserve funding both mitigate these two risks.
Other risks of CCRC's are more common to all real estate. These include
unexpectedly slow occupancy at startup, excessive construction costs, high
interest-rates, and market downturns that cause high vacancy during the
operating life of a project. Construction costs may affect different financing
schemes more or less equally, but slow occupancy, the effect of market
downturns, and high interest rates obviously depend on pricing and what
kind of debt a project has.
A summary of Ashford's returns is in TABLE 6-13.
On the whole, resident financing appears to go farthest in Ashford's case to
mitigate most of these risks, and at the same time is most profitable to the
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TABLE 6-13: SUMMARY OF RETURNS (000'S)
PROFIT. ROE INFLATION INFLATION RESERVE TAX
ALTERNATIVE STARTUP RES OPER RESALE URSING TOTAL INDEX STAB. + RETURN - RISK FUNDING TREATMENT
RESIDENT FINANCING 5,789 1,850 1,161 301 9,101 192.2% 16.9% LOW HIGH EASY UNFAVORABLE
Percent of total 63.6% 203% 12.8% 33% 100.0%
TRUST/MORTGAGE FINANCING
0% ARBITRAGE 0 3,296 1,161 301 4,756 100.4% 21.6% LOW HIGH DIFFICULT NEUTRAL
Percent of total 0.0% 693% 24.4% 63% 100.0%
-2% ARBITRAGE 0 2,271 1,161 301 3,732 78.8% 16.9% LOW HIGH
Percent of total 0.0% 60.9% 31.1% 8.1% 100.0%
RENTAL (2,072) 987 0 301 (784) -27.0% 13.7% HIGH MODERATE VERY FAVORABLE
Percent of total 264.2% -126.0% 0.0% -383% 100.0% DIFFICULT
00
00
developer. For projects with different configurations, and with more
innovative financing mechanisms, one of the other two alternatives might be
more appropriate. Chapter 7 discusses these issues in greater detail. For
Ashford, however, resident financing can mitigate the refund and nursing
liabilities most easily because it allows for establishment of higher reserves.
An appropriate reserve at Ashford is probably closer to $3 to $4 million than
$1 million, based on Chapter 5's crude estimates of refund and nursing
liabilities. The developers, in fact, are considering a reserve in this range. A
large reserve helps with marketing as well as risk-reduction for liabilities,
since prospect may compare reserve amounts with competitors. A non-
profit, resident-financed CCRC near Ashford, of similar size, purchase
prices and services, funded a $10,000,000 reserve out of startup profits. The
reserve income helps to lower monthly fees. With such competition, large
reserves may be a marketing necessity. In this sense resident-financing helps
reduce occupancy risk. It also helps reduce occupancy risk through pricing,
to the extent that it (along with the trust/mortgage-financed scheme) is less
expensive on a capitalized basis for residents. Interest-rate risk is reduced
since the project carries no permanent debt.
Resident-financing's greatest ostensible drawback is the lack of readily
available refunds in case of a mass exodus (eg, with the closing of the
facility). Yet the trust used with mortgage financing does not readily resolve
this problem. With any significant negative arbitrage, it is necessarily small.
With most negative arbitrage spreads, it is likely that the value of the facility
sold at a discount is greater than the value of the trust, and potentially low
liquidity of the trust further reduces its usefulness. Funding "short-term"
reserves is hard with trust/mortgage financing, and the short maturity of
conventional mortgages introduces a refinancing risk. If neutral or almost-
neutral arbitrage were available, the trust/mortgage financing option would
be more plausible. For proprietary projects it is not readily available, and
playing with amortization and changes in the rate levels (eg, a higher rate of
interest income as the basis for the spread) does not sufficiently reduce
negative arbitrage to a feasible spread.
Choosing the permanent financing structure also involves construction
financing considerations. If construction financing is tied to presales, both of
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the upfront-fee alternatives may be advantageous, since the deposits required
with presales are somewhat stronger collateral than the smaller ones paid for
rental preleases. The upfront-fee projects also reduce risk because, with
slow absorption, construction financing may be taken out with sales revenue.
With rentals construction or permanent financing must be carried regardless
of fill-up. This is more problematic with the trust alternative than with
resident financing, but it may be possible temporarily until later sales fund
the trust.
To this point, this section has listed the downside risks of the financing
options. What is the upside potential? Solely because of its startup profit,
resident-financing offers significantly more return to the developer than the
trust/mortgage financing alternative. The rental alternative potentially
offers significant return from futures and from operations with high
inflation. But affordability problems might limit the full benefits of
inflation, since affordability could easily constrain raising all fees at the
inflation rate. Resident financing does not benefit from inflation as much.
Yet its startup profit appears a more assured return than those with a rental
structure.
After-tax analysis would show change in some of the relative value of the
returns. Depreciation will raise the value of rental cash flow. Depending on
the outcome of tax reform, capital gains special treatment would favor the
rental futures over the startup profit and resale income of resident-financing.
However, selecting a financing structure for its tax benefits does nothing to
resolve the various downside risks. Overall, for the proprietary CCRC
developer, with a project of Ashford's characteristics, resident financing
most effectively mitigates risks and should provide the largest returns.
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7
Alternative Strategies and Future
Directions for Continuing Care
An empirical analysis based on a single project is bound to be colored by the
nature of that project. The financial analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 reflects
assumptions about Ashford's startup timing, development costs, and
operating revenues and expenses. Above all, it reflects Ashford's nature as
an expensive, upscale project. All the various financing alternatives, one way
or another, are able to make it a profitable project. Much more is needed to
ensure success, of course: careful site selection, market analysis, design,
marketing, construction cost control, and actuarial prediction, among other
factors. Selecting feasible financing is only one part of developing projects
as complex as CCRC's. But it is probably the most important part. The case
study has illustrated some of the complexities of CCRC's that face the
proprietary developer and some of the CCRC characteristics that differ from
other residential development. It has briefly indicated how marketing and
state regulatory considerations informed development decisions, and shown
how one development group has approached the risks of refunds and nursing
care. The case has attempted to quantify these risks. Finally, it has analyzed
the benefits and risks of three financing and pricing alternatives, and
recommended resident financing for this project.
There is a need for further analysis of other risks that are common to most
real estate, such as unexpectedly slow absorption. Above all, further study
should examine the various risks and returns of profit centers, liabilities and
financing methods interactively. This paper has used sensitivity analysis to
explore the issues in isolation. This is useful to quantify individual cost and
profit levels, but not for making development decisions in a working
environment.
As an conclusion to the case study, this chapter will discuss development
options and financing schemes that could improve the feasibility of
continuing care facilities in general.
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1. THE NEED TO BUILD A MORE AFFORDABLE PRODUCT
AND TO REDUCE OPERATING RISKS
In terms of affordability, Ashford is near the top of the market. Its pricing is
appropriate for its location in an affluent part of a city where the market for
retirement centers has barely been tapped. If proprietary developers are to
penetrate the potential market for retirement centers with any significant
impact, however, they must produce and operate them at lower cost.
Eventually, they may or may not be able to make retirement centers
affordable to a higher percentage of their target market than other newly
constructed housing types are fortheir target markets. By seeking solutions
for a number of problems they can at least start down that path.
In addition to using financing that costs less, affordability will improve with
lower non-financing development and operating costs and risks. Reducing
both physical plant costs and operating costs such as nursing will boost
affordability. And lowering these costs will in itself attract less-costly
financing sources.
Changing Product Configurations. This paper has focussed on
continuing care retirement centers with unlimited nursing guarantees.
Different product configurations are likely to produce different development
and operating profit margins. Some physical changes that may increase
affordability for residents (or profitability for developers) are listed below,
although they need further analysis.
- Determining the limit to economies of scale, and building at that level
- Increasing nursing center size to offer more economies of scale in nursing
and increase its effect as a profit center
- Using phasing to deal with slow absorption
- Adjusting unit mix for more profitable units (eg two- and three-bedrooms),
although whether this results in decreased profitability when a community
matures (and double occupancy declines) should be studied
- Downsizing units and reducing common-area amenities to lesser,
congregate-level standards
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Changes involving operations and services center on adjusting the heart of
the CCRC: nursing care. Limitation of nursing care is the primary trend in
CCRC product configuration today. And a full examination of varied fee
structures and their effect on marketability, affordability and developer
return is necessary. Two other service provisions may have an effect on
costs:
- Using assisted living to reduce nursing care utilization
- Using in-unit assisted and nursing care to avoid full subsidy of temporary
patients in assisted units or the nursing center
Reducing Future Liabilities. Eventually, long-term care insurance
might assume a key role in boosting affordability of unlimited care facilities,
and in the process save the concept from demise in favor of limited care
policies. Whether or not the insurance costs less than self-insurance over
time, if its price reflects the needs of many beneficiaries in many facilities
then it should not be subject to the fluctuations and dramatic increases that
self-insurance (in a maturing facility especially) is subject to. These benefits
should cover assisted living expenses as well if current policies are indicative
of future coverage. Insurance companies might become more involved in
financing retirement centers to share in their profitability, and to benefit
from the reluctance of some other, even more risk-adverse financial
institutions to enter the field. Then it is conceivable that insurance companies
would accept increased actuarial risk (ie, lower insurance rates) in return for
equity positions in projects. At any rate, if developers use insurance to
absorb actuarial risk, which until now has scared off many debt sources or
made the rates high for proprietary CCRC's, then they should benefit from
more available and less expensive debt. The result will be a more affordable
project. Insurance companies have already taken the innovative step of
introducing long-term care insurance, and the tremendous need for more
complex insurance schemes for CCRC's is likely to continue the initial
innovation. Projects with limited nursing liability may become more
attractive if residents can individually purchase long-term care insurance.
Furthermore, if insurance frees some of the excess resale proceeds from
placement in a reserve, these will be available for investor profits in
innovative financing structures.
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New pricing strategies should also emerge to reduce liability from future
refunds. Aside from simply not guaranteeing the refund as at Ashford
(which still does not release the facility from liability to the extent funds are
available), strategies are possible that reduce the refund rates and still
preserve buyers' estates. By letting buyers share in the appreciation of units,
lower refunds rates are possible with a likely chance of net gain to the
resident over the usual flat, static refund rate. For example, with an 80%
refund rate and a minimum appreciation of just 1.185% over 10 years, when
the buyer shares in appreciation he or she receives a larger refund than with a
90% refund on the original purchase. As noted in Chapter 5, lowering the
refund rate dramatically reduces future liability with deflation and, of
course, increases resale current income with inflation. Whether giving the
buyer effective equity in the unit also entails sharing full downside risks
would have to be resolved. Such a scheme also assumes that the excess resale
gain given up is not needed for other liabilities such as nursing.
2. NEW FINANCIAL STRATEGIES
Despite the ability for all of the three choices to make Ashford a profitable
investment, each has at least nominal drawbacks. And when applied to less
luxurious projects, the problems generally increase. More alternatives are
needed. Since new financial products develop with a need or opportunity to
increase financial returns and resolve obstacles of existing options, CCRC's
are ripe for many new financing strategies. So are congregates, but to a
lesser extent because they already benefit from several financing options not
available to continuing care centers.
Without resident financing, retirement centers generally require low
mortgage rates to be economically sound. In the case of using mortgages
with a trust, low rates minimize negative arbitrage. With rental projects, as
with most rental apartments in the U.S. today, below market rates increase
affordability which would otherwise be severely constrained. The problem
for retirement centers is that lenders perceive them as highly risky projects
and want a compensation for this risk.
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One resolution is to insure the debt with credit enhancement and reduce its
risk premium. The FHA 221.D insurance program has dramatically
promoted the development of rental congregates, increasing their access to
tax-exempt and taxable bonds at low rates. Credit enhancement for
proprietary CCRC's is far less available; it can be obtained privately but is
not common. Credit enhancement is now expensive, reflecting the risk
perceived. The savings it brings in a decreased interest rate may not pay for
the credit enhancement itself. With development of more proprietary
CCRC's, debt insurance for CCRC's, and conceivably rating by Moody's or
Standard & Poors, may become more available. This would have an
immense effect on debt availability and cost. Rental CCRC's might qualify
for credit enhancement with more competitive pricing, implying an
unbundling of services. Debt financed by a trust may be the best candidate
for credit enhancement, however, since the trust income can be dedicated to
debt service as long as the facility operates.
Aside from the need for lower-cost debt obtained through credit
enhancement, retirement centers seem appropriate for high-risk
participating financing that will accept low guaranteed return in exchange
for equity positions. With rental projects, either congregate or CCRC's, this
participation could be like almost any of the equity and participating debt
structures that abound in commercial and multifamily real estate.
With upfront fee projects, the returns to the participating financing sources
would have to be different in nature. Depending on how nursing subsidies
are structured, residential cash flow may decline and be a poor source for
participating returns. Without fixed debt (or with the debt serviced by a trust
and not operating revenues), project cash flow benefits minimally from
inflation.If the nursing center has its own mortgage, it does benefit amply
from inflation but in absolute terms the nursing center is not a primary profit
center. Tax benefits, even to shelter the project's own cash flow, are not
available with cooperatives. Thus with upfront fee projects, cash flow and
tax benefits are unlikely to attract the participating financing.
The logical form of investors' return in an upfront fee project is from resale
activity, which is the CCRC's form of futures. The resale current income
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itself---the non-refundable portion of resales---would provide a relatively
low return on a significant equity investment (eg, 12-year average of less
than 10% with an 80% refund rate and enough equity to lower the debt
service one point). With inflation, however, the excess resale proceeds can
be large. If this money (with or without the resale income) is available and
not needed for nursing liability or as resident equity return, it makes a
plausible source of funds to secure very high-risk equity. This equity can be
used to reduce developer equity or debt service. Alternatively, the resale
yield can constitute the participation for debt providing below-market rates
on a mortgage. Where equity can be cashed out of a project early, as with
resident financing, it should be easily to obtain equity money for the initial
expenses that cannot be financed. Yet this involves giving up an almost
guaranteed short-term return. Giving up the two kinds of resale return is
less of a sacrifice, involving an uncertain, long-term gain. However, the net
gain to the developer must be examined more carefully; if resale income and
excess proceeds are not needed to fund reserves, then a large amount of the
startup profits must be spent on reserves with most product configurations.
Structuring participating financing with upfront fee projects will be difficult.
Such projects are not necessarily more risky than those which are all-rental,
but the latter have the advantage of being a familiar type of fee structure with
several sources of revenue for participating financing.
What will be the sources of unsecured, low fixed-cost, participating
financing for CCRC's? Banks and savings and loans are unlikely candidates
to supply such debt. Insurance companies and pensions may be more
forthcoming eventually after they have gained more experience in the field.
It may be possible to structure financing with participating, high-risk taxable
bonds whose return would largely come from participation in resales or
futures. Equity investment funds, such as real estate investment trusts
(REIT's) could supply a substantial proportion of a project's financing in
conjunction with conventional debt. Bond funds and equity funds may
considerably reduce risk by assembling diversified portfolios with facilities
balanced by age, type and location.
Low cost debt tied primarily to futures, such as zero coupon bonds and
accrual mortgages, are an option for rental projects if they are used in small
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enough proportions to be repaid when due. They have to be used with other
debt or equity, otherwise the probability that appreciation will fall far behind
the interest rate jeopardizes the ability to repay.
A joint venture with a nonprofit organization has a number of benefits for
proprietary developers, but tax reform is likely to eliminate most of these.
In such arrangements, a proprietary group develops a CCRC and leases it to a
non-profit group, which can use its reputation to market the project and
which operates it. The proprietary group receives tax benefits in the early
years using accelerated depreciation. It later sells the facility to the non-
profit group which, by retaining the operating profits and resale proceeds,
may be in a position to buy. The proprietary group finances the project with
equity and with debt secured by income from a trust of entrance fees. This
arrangement is unlikely to be feasible for proprietary developers after tax
reform, but liaisons with non-profit groups will continue to be important in
obtaining certification and nursing care licenses, credibility for marketing,
and especially well-situated land at low cost. Also, proprietary developers
can act as development agents for non-profits with or without equity
positions. Without equity, income would come from development fees
(which may be up to 10% of project costs), construction fees, marketing
commisions and management contracts. For proprietary developers with
expertise who wish to reduce risk in exchange for a smaller return, this
structure can be ideal.
3. THE POTENTIAL OF THE INDUSTRY
As development of proprietary CCRC's and congregate projects rises, new
financial products and techniques will undoubtedly be in company. The
nature of some of the entrants to the industry will encourage financial
inventiveness. They may mix corporate finance practices with real estate.
Marriott Corporation, for example, will draw on an unrestricted corporate
line of credit to finance construction of its lifecare projects at rates below
conventional construction financing, and may decide to continue servicing
the original debt indefinitely, rather than using entrances fees as a take out or
securing permanent debt, depending on rates when development is complete.
Some entrants will go directly to the capital markets to secure financing.
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Oxford Development has arranged $300 million in tax-exempt limited
partnerships for financing its congregate centers. These will provide
participating tax-exempt debt. As competitors in the retirement center
industry, large firms will find it easiest to secure low cost debt, to survive
long startup periods and to assemble risk-balanced portfolios. They will be
able to use non-project-specific financing (eg, Marriott's line of credit) when
it provides lower rates.
For the small developer without these advantages, it is currently simpler to
finance congregates than CCRC's. Congregates benefit from less risk
because the nursing care and refund liabilities, financing sources accept the
fee structure and credit enhancement is readily available.
The potential for the industry appears excellent over the long term, for
developers who can absorb the downside risks if they materialize. More
product and financing experimentation is likely to produce highly profitable
models for development. While the market may be small now (and never
large), few real estate products are assured of growth while in their infancy.
To realize their potential, new financing sources to make continuing care
communities more affordable are needed---and therefore likely to emerge.
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NUMBER % TYPE % TOTAL SQ FT TOTAL SQ FT % TOTAL
INDEPENDENT UNITS:
ILU STUDIO 0 0% 0% 0 0
ILU 1 BR A 60 22% 20% 625 37,500
ILU 1 BR B 75 28% 25% 775 58,125
ILU 2 BR A 75 28% 25% 950 71,250
ILU 2 BR B 60 22% 20% 1,100 66,000
270 232,875
ASSISTED UNITS:
ALU STUDIC 30 100% 10% 450 13,500
ALU 1 BR 0 0% 0% 0 0
30 13,500
TOTAL UNI 300 246,375 74%
CIRCULATION @ 20% 49,275 15%
295,650 89%
COMMON AREA: SQ FT
LOBBIES/ENTRY LOUNGES 4,500
OTHER LOUNGES 1,000
LIBRARY 400
CLUB 200
CONFERENCE 200
AUDITORIUM 2,000
SNACK BAR/STORE 400
BEAUTY/BARBER 250
CRAFTS 250
EXERCISE/JACUZZI CENTER 1,000
GUEST ROOMS (2@300) 600
OFFICES 1,000
NURSE/EXAM 250
RESIDENT SERVICES 1,200
DINING ROOM (@12 SQ FT PP) 4,500
PRIVATE DINING 300
KITCHEN 2,400
HOUSEKEEPING/MAIN/STORAGE 3,500
LAUNDRIES (5@400) 2,000
UNIT STOR (@30 SQ FT, 50% NET 1 4,500
TOTAL 30,450 30,450 9%
CIRCULATION @ 20% 6,090 2%
36,540 11%
TOTAL 332,190 100%
BALCONIES (@50 SQ FT/UNIT, 80% UNITS, 9,000
@75% NET SINCE $45/SQ FT)
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APPENDIX TABLE 1: ASHFORD SPACE ANALYSIS
APPENDIX TABLE 2: ASHFORD DEVELOPMENT
(RESIDENT FINANCING ALTERNATIVE)
LAND:
HARD COSTS:
CONSTRUCTION
BALCONIES
SITE IMPROVEMENTS
NURSING HOME TOTAL
SOFT COSTS:
A&E
CONSULTANTS
LEGAL
PERMITS
FFE
RE TAXES
MARKETING
MISC SOFT
CONST INTEREST
ORIGINATION
SUBTOTAL
DEVELOPMENT FEE
CONTINGENCY
TOTAL DEV COST
TOTAL COST COST/UNIT % TOTAL
1,600,000 5,333 4.2%
19,931,400 66,438 52.4%
540,000 1,800 1.4%
3,475,000 11,583 9.1%
2,485,000 8,283 6.5%
26,431,400 88,105 69.5%
1,585,884 5,286 4.2%
100,000 333 0.3%
435,000 1,450 1.1%
100,000 333 0.3%
850,000 2,833 2.2%
500,000 1,667 1.3%
1,500,000 5,000 3.9%
50,000 167 0.1%
2,613,600 8,712 6.9%
67,095 224 0.2%
7,801,579 26,005 20.5%
35,832,979 119,443 94.3%
1,074,989 3,583 2.8%
1,107,239 3,691 2.9%
38,015,207 126,717 100.0%
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
2
11
13
14
16
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COSTS
NOTES:
Calculated separately to void square foot count in operating expenses
5,000 per unit
Construction financing based on 33% average draw over 24 months (36,000,000 loan amount)
Origination fee for nursing home mortgage
Contingency is relatively low percentage because it is based on entire cost
APPENDIX TABLE 3:
STAFFING:
ADMINISTRATIO
ADMINISTRATOR
MARKETING DIR
ACTIVITIES DIR
RECEPTION
SECRETARY
BOOKEEPER
SECURITY
PERSONAL AIDES
PHYSICAL REHA
HOUSEKEEPING:
SUPERVISOR
HOUSEKEEPERS
JANITOR
ROVING HELPER
LAUNDRY AIDE
MAINTENANCE:
SUPERVISOR
GROUNDSPERSO
DRIVER
PAYROLL
BENEFITS @
TOTAL STAFFINC
PER UNIT/MONT
OPERATING:
REAL ESTATE TA
UTILITIES
INSURANCE
MISCELLANEOU
MANAGEMENT F
TOTAL
PER UNIT/MONT
FTE WAGE ANNUAL/PP ANNUAL
N:
1.0 45,000 45,000
1.0 25,000 25,000
1.0 20,000 20,000
2.0 $6.50 13,520 27,040
1.0 $7.50 15,600 15,600
1.0 $8.00 16,640 16,640
4.2 $6.00 12,480 52,416
6.0 $6.00 12,480 74,880
B 1.0 $8.00 16,640 16,640
18.2 293,216
3.0 $8.00 16,640 49,920
7.0 $6.00 12,480 87,360
2.0 $6.50 13,520 27,040
S 3.5 $6.00 12,480 43,680
1.0 $6.00 12,480 12,480
16.5 220,480
1.0 25,000 25,000
N 3.0 $6.00 12,480 37,440
2.0 $6.00 12,480 24,960
6.0 87,400
40.7 601,096
20.0% 120,219
721,315
H 200
PRICE/UNIT NO. UNITS TOTAL
XE
EE
H
$2.00
$1.50
$0.20
$1.40
6.0%
/SQ FT
/SQ FT
/SQ FT
/PP/DAY
332,190
332,190
332,190
136,875
4,410,000
664,380
498,285
66,438
191,625
264,600
1,685,328
468
DIETARY:
TOTAL DIETARY
PER UNIT/MONTH
$6.00 /PP/DAY 136,875 821,250
228
TOTAL (EXC NURSING SUBSIDY AND RESERVE):
TOTAL
TOTAL PER UNIT/MONTH
AVERAGE RENT/MONTH
3,227,893
897
1,215
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ASHFORD EXPENSES
APPENDIX TABLE 5: FINANCING DATA
TRUST/MORTGAGE FINANCING WITH 0% ARBITRAGE
FINANCING:
CONSTRUCTION FINANCING:
AMOUNT $36,000,000
CONST INT RATE 11.00%
AVER OUTSTAND. 33.0%
CONST PERIOD 24 MOS
CONST POINTS 0.0%
PERMANENT FINANCING:
SOURCE: AMOUNT FEE AMORT RATE PAYMENT COMMENTS
1. NURS. HOME MTG 2,236,500 3.0% 30 11.0% (255,585) 90% LTV
2. CCRC MTG 36,660,000 3.0% 30 8.0% (3,227,977)
0.0%
EQU1TY FINANCING:
SOURCE: AMOUNT PRIORITY TERM YMENT COMMENTS
3. SALES
4. SALES
5. SALES
6. SALES
TOTAL SALES
285,485 FUNDS DEVELOPMENT DEFICIT
43,199,515 ASSIGNED TO TRUST
1,000,000 ASSIGNED TO SHORT TERM RESERVE
1,340,000 DEV START UP PROFITS
45,825,000
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APPENDIX TABLE 5: TRUST/MORTGAGE FINANCING WITH 0% ARBITRAGE-..PROJECTED RESICENTIAL OPERATIONS BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
YEAR: q
INCOME:
1 ILU'S
2 ALU'S
3 DOUBLE OCCUI
4 SERVICE FEE
5 MISC INCOME
LA TION
0.0% 3,519,000
0.0% 540,000
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
POTENTIAL OPERATING:
VACANCY
LESS VACANCY
EFFECTIVE OPERATING
INTEREST INCOME
TOTAL REVENUE
EXPENSES:
NURSING SUBSIDY
PLUS VACANCY
STAFFING 0.0%
OPERATING 0.0%
PLUS VACANCY
DIETARY 0.0%
PLUS VACANCY
TOTAL OPERATING EXPE
REPLACE. RESE 1.50%
2
3,519,000
540,000
3 4
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000
315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000
351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000
1 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000 4,410,000
70.0% 22.5% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
(3,087,000) (992,250) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500) (220,500)
1,323,000 3,417,750 4,189,500 4,189,500
0 523,161 3,535,961 3,535,961
1,323,000 3,940,911 7,725,461 7,725,461
(297,327)
208,129
(432,789)
(1,685,328)
438,019
(821,250)
574,875
(66,150)
(339,204)
76,321
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
59,535
(821,250)
184,781
(66,150)
(381,081)
19,054
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(66,150)
(422,958)
21,148
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(66,150)
4,189,500
3,535,961
7,725,461
(464,835)
23,242
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,615,194)
(66,150)
4,189,500
3.535.961
7,725,461
(506,712)
25,336
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,654,977)
(66,150)
4,189,500 4,189,500 4,189,500 4,189,500
3,535,961 3,535,961 3,535,961 3,535,961
7,725,461 7,725,461 7,725,461 7,725,461
(548,589)
27,429
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,694,760)
(66,150)
(590,466)
29,523
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,734,543)
(66.150)
(632,343)
31,617
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,774,326)
(66,150)
(674,220)
33,711
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,814,109)
(66.150)
4,189,500
3,535,961
1,725,461
(716,097)
35,805
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,853,893)
(66,150)
4,189,500
3,535,961
7,725,461
(757,974)
37,899
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,893,676)
(66,150)
21 NEI OPERATING INCOME
22 DEBT SERVICE
23 PARTICIPATION
24 BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
(758,821) 628,301 4,123,684 4,083,901 4,044,118 4,004,334 3,964,551 3,924,768 3,884,985 3,845,202 3,805,419 3,765,635
(3,227,977) (3,227,977) (3,227,977) (3,227,977) (3,227,977) (3,227,977) (3,227,977) (3,227,977) (3,227,977) (3,227,977)
(758,821) 628,301 895,707 855,924 816,140 776,357 736,574 696,791 657,008 617,225 577,442 537,658
NOTES:
3 Figured at average double occupancy rate stated in assumptions. Actual rate would decline as community matures.
10 Total of reserve and trust income shown in TABLE 4.
From nursing subsidy in table TABLE 5. Also assumed equal to insurance premium if long term care insurance premium used.
Based on vacancy rate in Line 7
Staffing Year I only adjusted for vacancy (load of twice occupancy rate)
Vacancy on management fee only, except Year 1 where also adjusted for 50% of occupancy
Based on vacancy rate in Line 7
Figured on potential operating revenue
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
12
13
14
16
18
20
LATION
,539,
- -- -----
1
1
WITH 0% ARBITRAGE---EQUITY REQUIREMENTS (in 000's)
TOTAL SALES 45,825
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT (39,182)
GROSS PROFIT 6,643
LESS RESERVE (1,000)
NET BUILDING PROFIl 5,643
ACTIVITY: START UP
YEAR:
START UP FUND (375)
LAND (1,600)
PRECONSTRUCTION C( (1,700)
MARKETING (375)
REMAINING DEVELOPMENT COST!
(4,050)
RESERVE
SALES
SURPLUS (DEFICIT) (4,050),
14 CONST FINANCING REi 0
CONST FINANCING PAID:
15 WITH SURPLUS
16 WITH PERMANENT FINANCING
17 CONST FINANCING OUTSTANDIN( (
18 PERMANENT FINANCING RECIEVED
19 DEVELOPER START UP PAYMENT
20 DEVELOPER EQUITY RETURN
21 ASSIGNED TO TRUST FROM SALES
22 ASSIGNED TO TRUST FROM CCRC MTG
23 PERMANENT FINANCING DUE
DEVELOPMENT CASH I
OPERATIONS CASH FLOW
EQUITY REQUIRED
CUMMULATIVE
(4,050)
(4,050)
(4,050)
CONSTONST/OPER
1
(375)
(17,003)
(17,378)
(17,378)
(375)
(17,003)
(17,378)
22,913
5,534
17,378
17,378)
(5,534)
(2,237)
(9,608)
(2,237)
2,237
0
0
(4,050)
0
(830)
(830)
(4,880)
NOTES:
Does not include operating deficit
Total development costs less all costs in lines 6-9
Assumes full coverage
Begins earning interest Year 2
Begins earning interest Year 3
From TABLE 7
1
2
3
4
5
14.5%
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
OPER
2
(375)
(375)
(1,000)
22,913
21,538
(9,608)
0
36,660
(1,340)
(4,050)
(6,540)
(36,660)
(34,424)
5,390
741
6,131
1,251
24
25
26
27
2
10
14
21
22
25
105
APPENDIX TABLE 6: TRUST/MORTGAGE FINANCING
APPENDIX TABLE 7: TRUST/MORTGAGE FINANCING
FINANCING DATA
CONSTRUCTION FINANCING:
AMOUNT $36,000,000
CONST INT RATE 11.00%
AVER OUTSTAND. 33.0%
CONST PERIOD 24 MOS
CONST POINTS 0.0%
PERMANENT FINANCING:
SOURCE: AMOUNT FEE AMORT RATE PAYMENT COMMENTS
1. NURS. HOME M' 2,236,500 3.0% 30 11.0% (255,585) 90% LTV
2. CCRC MTG 22,132,793 3.0% 30 10.0% (2,330,773)
2.0%
EQU7Y FINANCING:
SOURCE: AMOUNT COMMENTS
3. SALES
4. SALES
5. SALES
6. SALES
TOTAL SALES
14,350,335
29,134,665
1,000,000
1,340,000
45,825,000
FUNDS DEVELOPMENT DEFICIT
ASSIGNED TO TRUST
ASSIGNED TO SHORT TERM RESERVE
DEV START UP PROFITS
106
APPENDIX TABLE 8: TRUST/MORTGAGE FINANCING WITH 2% ARBITRAGE---PROJECTED RESIDENTIAL OPERATIONS BEFORE
YEAR:
INCOME:
1 ILU'S
2 ALU'S
3 DOUBLE OCCU
4 SERVICE FEE
5 MISC INCOME
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
NFLATION 1 2
0.0% 3,519,000
0.0% 540,000
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
POTENTIAL OPERATING RI 4,410,000
VACANCY 70.0%
LESS VACANCY (3,087,000)
EFFECTIVE OPERATING RI 1,323,000
INTEREST INCOME 0
TOTAL REVENUE 1,323,000
EXPENSES:
NURSING SUBSIDY
PLUS VACANCY
STAFFING 0.0%
OPERATING 0.0%
PLUS VACANCY
DIETARY 0.0%
PLUS VACANCY
TOTAL OPER ATING EXPEN
REPLACE. RESI 1.50%
21 NET OPERATING INCOME
22 DEBT SERVICE
23 PARTICIPATION
(297,327)
208,129
(432,789)
(1,685,328)
438,019
(821,250)
574,875
(2,015,661)
(66,150)
3,519,000
540,000
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
540,000
54000 50.00 40000 54000, ,4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000 4,059,000
315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000
351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 331,000
3,519,000
540,000
3,519,000
54000
3,519,000
4,410,000
22.5%
(2250)
560,150
3,977,900
(339,204)
76,321
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
59,535
(821,250)
184,781
(3,246,460)
(66.150)
4,410,000
5.0%
(220,500)
2,410,773
6,600,273
(381,081)
19,054
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,535,627)
(66.150)
4,410,000
5.0%
4,189,00
2,410,773
6,600,273
(422,958)
21,148
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,575,411)
(66.150)
4,410,000
5.0%
2,410,773
6,600,273
(464,835)
23,242
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,615,194)
(66.150)
4,410,000
5.0%
(20500)
2,410,773
6,600,273
(506,712)
25,336
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,654,977)
(66.150)
4,410,000
5.0%
2,410,773
6,600,273
(548,589)
27,429
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,694,760)
(66,150)
4,410,000
5.0%
2,410,773
6,600,273
(590,466)
29,523
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,734,543)(66,150)
4,410,000
5.0%
2,410,773
6,600,273
(632,343)
31,617
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,774,326)
(66,150)
4,410,000
5.0%
(220,500)
4,189,500
2,410,773
6,600,273
(674,220)
33,711
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,814,109)
(66,150)
4,410,000
5.0%
2,410,773
6,600,273
(716,097)
35,805
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(66,150)(66. 150)
4,410,000
5.0%
2,410,773
6,600,273
(757,974)
37,899
(721,315)
(1,685,328)
13,230
(821,250)
41,063
(3,89 076)(66,150)
(758,821) 665,290 2,998,496 2,958,713 2,918,930 2,879,146 2,839,363 2,799,580 2,759,797 2,720,014 2,680,231 2,640,447
(2,330,773) (2,330,773) (2,330,773) (2,330,773) (2,330,773) (2,330,773) (2,330,773) (2,330,773) (2,330,773) (2,330,773)
24 BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
3
10
12
13
14
16
18
20
(758,821) 665,290 667,723 627,940 588,156 548,373 508,590 468,807 429,024 389,241 349,457 309,674
NOTES:
Figured at average double occupancy rate stated in assumptions. Actual rate would decline as community matures.
Total of reserve and trust income shown in TABLE 4.
From nursing subsidy in table TABLE 5. Also assumed equal to insurance premium if long term care insurance premium used.
Based on vacancy rate in Line 7
Staffing Year 1 only adjusted for vacancy (load of twice occupancy rate)
Vacancy on management fee only, except Year 1 where also adjusted for 50% of occupancy
Based on vacancy rate in Line 7
Figured on potential operating revenue
I-L
TAX CASH FLOW
APPENDIX TABLE 9: TRUST/MORTGAGE FINANCING
WITH 2% ARBITRAGE---EQUITY REQUIREMENTS (in 000's)
TOTAL SALES 45,825
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT (38,720)
GROSS PROFIT 7,105 15.5%
LESS RESERVE (1,000)
NET BUILDING PROFI' 6,105
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
ACTIVITY: START UP
YEAR:
START UP FUND (375)
LAND (1,600)
PRECONSTRUCTION C4 (1,700)
MARKETING (375)
REMAINING DEVELOPMENT COST!b
(4,050)
RESERVE
SALES
SURPLUS (DEFICIT) (4,050)
14 CONST FINANCING REI 0
CONST FINANCING PAID:
15 WITH SURPLUS
16 WITH PERMANENT FINANCING
17 CONST FINANCING DUE (
18 PERMANENT FINANCING RECIEVED
19 DEVELOPER START UP PAYMENT
20 DEVELOPER EQUITY RETURN
21 ASSIGNED TO TRUST FROM SALES
22 ASSIGNED TO TRUST FROM CCRC MTG
23 PERMANENT FINANCING DUE
CONSTONST/OPER
1
(375)
(16,772)
(375)
(16,772)
OPER
2
(375)
(17,147) (17,147) (375)
(1,000)
22,913 22,913
(17,147) 5,765 21,538
17,147
(5,765)
(2,237)
17,147) (9,146)
(9,146)
0
(2,237) 22,133
(1,340)
(4,050)
(7,002)
(22,133)
2,237 (19,896)
DEVELOPMENT CASH 1T
OPERATIONS CASH FLOW
EQUITY REQUIRED
CUMMULATIVE
(4,050)
(4,050)
(4,050)
0 0
(830)
0 (830)
(4,050) (4,880)
NOTES:
Does not include operating deficit
Total development costs less all costs in lines 6-9
Assumes full coverage
Begins earning interest Year 2
Begins earning interest Year 3
From TABLE 7
1
2
3
4
5
24
25
26
27
2
10
14
21
22
25
5,390
778
6,168
1,288
108
APPENDIX TABLE 10: ALL-RENTAL STRUCTURE-.-PROJECTED RESIDENTIAL OPERATIONS BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
YEAR:
INCOME:
1 ILU'S
2 ALU'S
3 DOUBLE OCCUPANCY
4 SERVICE FEE
5 MISC INCOME
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
POTENTIAL OPERATING
VACANCY
LESS VACANCY
EFFECTIVE OPERATING
INTEREST INCOME
TOTAL REVENUE
FLATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.0% 7,180,200 7,180,200 7,180,200 7,180,200 7,180,200 7,180,200 7,180,200 7,180,200 7,180,200 7,180,200 7,180,200 7,180,200
0.0% 946,800 946,800 946,800 946,800 946,800 946,800 946,800 946,800 946,800 946,800 946,800 946,800
8,127,000 8,127,000 8,127,000 8,127,000 8,127,000 8,127,000 8,127,000 8,127,000 8,127,000 8,127,000 8,127,000 8,127,000
0.0% 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000
0.0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.0% 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000
351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000 351,000
REVENUE 8,478,000 8,478,000 8,478,000 8,478,000 8,478,000 8,478,000 8,478,000 8,478,000 8,478,000 8,478,000 8,478,000 8,478,000
70.0% 22.5% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
(5,934,600) (1,907,550) (423,900) (423,900) (423,900) (423,900) (423,900) (423,900) (423,900) (423,900) (423,900) (423,900)
REVENUE
EXPENSES:
NURSING SUBSIDY
PLUS VACANCY
STAFFING 0.0%
OPERATING 0.0%
PLUS VACANCY
DIETARY 0.0%
PLUS VACANCY
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES
REPLACE. RESERVE@ 1.50%
21 NET OPERATING INCOME
22 DEBT SERVICE
23 DEBT COVERAGE RATIO
24 BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
2,543,400
40,000
2,583,400
(297,327)
208,129
(432,789)
(1,697,771)
610,742
(821,250)
574,875
(1,855,392)
(69,261)
6,570,450
80,000
6,650,450
(339,204)
76,321
(721,315)
(1,697,771)
114,453
(821,250)
184,781
(3,203,985)
(69,261)
8,054,100 8,054,100 8,054,100
80,000 80,000 80,000
8,134,100 8,134,100 8,134,100
(422,958)
21,148
(721,315)
(1,697,771)
25,434
(821,250)
41,063
(3,575,650)
(69,261)
(464,835)
23,242
(721,315)
(1,697,771)
25,434
(821,250)
41,063
(3,615,433)
(69,261)
(381,081)
19,054
(721,315)
(1,697,771)
25,434
(821,250)
41,063
(3,535,867)
(69,261)
8,054,100
80,000
8,134,100
(506,712)
25,336
(721,315)
(1,697,771)
25,434
(821,250)
41,063
(3,655,216)
(69,261)
8,054,100
80,000
8,134,100
(548,589)
27,429
(721,315)
(1,697,771)
25,434
(821,250)
41,063
(3,694,999)
(69,261)
8,054,100
80,000
8,134,100
(590,466)
29,523
(721,315)
(1,697,771)
25,434
(821,250)
41,063
(3,734,782)
(69,261)
8,054,100
80,000
8,134,100
(632,343)
31,617
(721,315)
(1,697,771)
25,434
(821,250)
41,063
(3,774,565)
(69,261)
8,054,100
80,000
8,134,100
(674,220) (
33,711
(721,315) (
(1,697,771) (1,
25,434
(821,250) (
41,063
(3,814,349) (3,
(69,261)_
8,054,100
80,000
8,134,100
716,097)
35,805
721,315)
697,771)
25,434
821,250)
41,063
854,132)
(69,261)
8,054,100
80,000
8,134,100
(757,974)
37,899
(721,315)
(1,697,771)
25,434
(821,250)
41,063
(3,893,915)
(69,261)
658,748 3,377,204 4,528,973 4,489,189 4,449,406 4,409,623 4,369,840 4,330,057 4,290,274 4,250,491 4,210,707 4,170,924
(1,930,306) (3,860,613) (3,860,613) (3,860,613) (3,860,613) (3,860,613) (3,860,613) (3,860,613) (3,860,613) (3,860,613) (3,860,613) (3,860,613)
1.17 1.16 1.15 1.14 1.13 1.12 1.11 1.10 1.09 1.08
(1,271,559) (483,409) 668,361 628,578 588,795 549,011 509,228 469,445 429,662 389,879 350,096 310,312
NOE'S:
3 Figured at average double occupancy rate stated in assumptions. Actual rate would decline as community matures.
10 Total of reserve and trust income shown in TABLE 4.
From nursing subsidy in table TABLE 5. Also assumed equal to insurance premium if long term care insurance premium used.
Based on vacancy rate in Line 7
Staffing Year I only adjusted for vacancy (load of twice occupancy rate)
Vacancy on management fee only, except Year 1 where also adjusted for 50% of occupancy
Based on vacancy rate in Line 7
Figured on potential operating revenue less debt service
12
13
14
16
18
20
APPENDIX TABLE 11: ALL-RENTAL STRUCTURE---
EQUITY REQUIREMENTS (in 000's)
4 LESS RESERVE (1,000)
ACTIVITY: START UP
YEAR:
START UP FUND (375)
LAND (1,600)
PRECONSTRUCTION C( (1,700)
MARKETING (375)
REMAINING DEVELOPMENT COST!
(4,050)
RESERVE
SALES
SURPLUS (DEFICIT) (4,050)
14 CONST FINANCING REI 0
CONST FINANCING PAID:
15 WITH SURPLUS
16 WITH PERMANENT FINANCING
17 CONST FINANCING OUTSTANDIN(
18 PERMANENT FINANCING RECEIVED
19 PERMANENT FINANCING DUE
DEVELOPMENT CASH I
OPERATIONS CASH FLOW
EQUITY REQUIRED
CUMMULATIVE
(4,050)
(4,050)
(4,050)
CONSTONST/OPER
1
(375) (375)
(17,206) (17,206)
(17,581) (17,581)
(1,000)
0
(17,581) (18,581)
17,581
36,162
18,581
0
(38,897)
(17,581) 0
38,897
(38,897)
0 2,734
(1,342)
0 1,392
(4,050) (2,658)
NOTES:
2 Does not include operating deficit
Total development costs less all costs in lines 6-9
Assumes full coverage
From TABLE 9
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
OPER
2
(375)
(375)
0
(375)
20
21
22
23
0
0
0
0
0
(375)
(417)
(792)
(3,450)
10
14
21
110
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